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Is Japan Free Riding to a 
Coprosperity Sphere in 
Pacific Asia? 
Shafiqul Islam 
The Americans concentrate on a vision of Japan as a closed society, 
driven  by  totally  selfish economic  motives,  unfairly  exploiting 
American military protection to dump its industrial-technological 
products on America while driving Americans out of their jobs. 
ZBIGNIEW  BRZEZINSKI 
The way  Japan Inc. operates also facilitates the formation of  an 
Asian co-prosperity zone: government and business work hand-in- 
glove and business moves jointly. They move together as a group, 
because they are so keenly aware of vulnerability on their own. The 
decision will be made by consensus, and the rest is routine. 
RUDIGER  DORNBUSCH 
8.1  Introduction 
Americans routinely label Japan an international free rider.’ The accusation 
is rooted in one simple fact: America spends 5-6  percent of its GNP on main- 
taining its military supremacy while Japan, committed to nonaggression for- 
malized by its “peace constitution”-and  protected by the 1960 United States- 
Japan mutual cooperation and security treaty-limits  its military spending to 
about 1 percent of GNP.2 Since neither America nor Japan’s Asian neighbors 
wish to see Japan-already  an economic superpower-engage  in rearmament 
and emerge as a military superpower, how to prevent Japan from enjoying a 
security free ride to  economic supremacy has become a matter of increasing 
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1. See, among others, Johnson (1986), House Armed Services Committee (1988), Schroeder 
(1988), Reed (1983), and MacIntosh (1987). 
2. Popular sentiment against war and the military is probably a more binding barrier against a 
sharp rise in Japan’s defense expenditure than the war-renouncing clause (Article 9) inserted by 
the American victors in the  1947 “peace constitution.” The 1 percent of GNF’  limit on defense 
expenditure was established by Prime Minister Miki in  1976. While this limit was broken de jure 
when the Diet approved a fiscal 1987 defense budget at 1.004 percent of GNP, conventional wis- 
dom notwithstanding, the actual defense spending so far has not exceeded the 1 percent limit. 
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concern to some Americam3 One resolution to this conundrum is official de- 
velopment assistance (ODA): there is virtual consensus on both sides of the 
Pacific that Japan should assume greater global responsibility by substantially 
expanding its economic assistance to the Third World.4 
The “foreign aid solution” to the free rider problem, however, has created a 
new quandary and concern: some Americans are now complaining that Japan 
is creating a new “coprosperity sphere” in Pacific Asia, with official aid driving 
private trade and investment. The accusation now is that Japan is providing aid 
primarily to promote its trade and investment interests in Pacific Asia, and not 
so much to meet the developmental needs of the recipient countrie~.~ 
This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that there is little basis for 
singling out Japan’s behavior as globally irresponsible and mercantilist and re- 
gionally neocolonialist. Section 8.2 critically reviews the popular concepts of 
burdensharing and military free ride, and questions the notion that the U.S. 
national defense is an international public good. Section 8.3 presents an empir- 
ical assessment of the view that Japan engages in unfair aid practices (provides 
low-quality aid) and aid mercantilism (gives aid to serve its own commercial 
and trade interests) in Pacific Asia and elsewhere. Section 8.4 looks at addi- 
tional evidence to assess the thesis that Tokyo is implementing an official aid 
3. Johnson (1986) sums it up as a Japanese defense dilemma: “Fear of revived militarism, then, 
constitutes the first horn of the Japanese defense dilemma. The other horn of the dilemma is, of 
course, the persistent charge that Japan is taking a free ride on the backs of the Americans, Kore- 
ans, Taiwanese, and all the other peoples of the Pacific Basin who take seriously their responsibilit- 
ies to try to maintain a stable and secure environment. This free ride is doubly galling since no 
nation profits more from international political and military security than does Japan.” See also 
Yamamura (1989). Hellmann (1989), and Brown (1987). 
4.  Balassa and Noland (1988, 188) suggest this resolution: “Japan could increase its defense 
capabilities by building up its conventional forces, naval strength, and air defenses. Japan would 
still rely on the United States for nuclear protection and for the defense of distant interests and 
would thus remain a significant free rider in defense matters. The government could partially offset 
that, however, by increasing its financial assistance to developing countries.” See also Kissinger 
and Vance (1988). McNamara (1992), Robinson (1986). Peterson (1987). Okita (1989,  1986), 
Murakami and Kosai (1986), Nakasone (1986), Takeshita (1991). and Kaifu (1989). 
5. See, for example, Arase (1991,  1988), Harrison (1991). Maidment (1989), Brown (1991), 
and Garten (1989-90.95).  Two chapters in this volume also propound this thesis: Katzenstein and 
Rouse (chap. 6) and Doner (chap. 5). For example, Katzenstein and Rouse write: “In January 1987 
MITI unveiled in Bangkok a program known as the New Aid Plan, dealing specifically with the 
issue of  infrastructural difficulties in Asia and their relation to the developmental needs of Japa- 
nese industry and the restructuring of  the Japanese economy in general.. . . The program is an 
attempt to relocate selected Japanese businesses to Southeast Asia through loans and technical 
assistance to governments. These loans will be used for the improvement of infrastructure, includ- 
ing industrial estates, ports, and improved telecommunication services.. . . MITI, the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, are attempting . . . to 
coordinate different aspects of this plan, the details of which are negotiated bilaterally with each 
government,” Rich Doner says: “One of its [the New Aid Plan’s] goals was to facilitate Japanese 
domestic restructuring. The other was to provide assistance to export-oriented industries in devel- 
oping Asia, including help in targeting particular sectors for development. These may be part of 
MITI’s efforts to extend its industrial planning and coordination activities into foreign economies 
in response to the expansion of Japanese FI and the lack of coherent industrial policies in host 
countries (Wade 1992,290):’ 323  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
plan to create a new coprosperity sphere-a  regional economy in East Asia to 
serve Japan’s economic interests. Section 8.5 examines the dynamics of United 
States-Japan cooperation and conflict in the Philippines and the Asian Devel- 
opment Bank (ADB) to further address the issue of Japan’s free-riding behavior 
and its strategy for gaining regional hegemony with mercantilist means. Sec- 
tion 8.6 summarizes the key conclusions. 
8.2  Burdensharing and Japan’s Free Ride: Is U.S. Defense Spending 
an International Public Good? 
Burdensharing and military (security) free ride are intimately related con- 
cepts. An ally that fails to bear its “fair share” of common defense burden, by 
definition, is enjoying a military free ride. (A country’s burden is typically 
measured by  its share of military spending in its GNP). When Americans first 
coined these terms, this burden referred to that of  common defense of  the 
members of NATO  against a possible attack from the Soviet Union, and the 
security free riders were America’s underburdened European allies.6 By  the 
late 1960s, Japan joined the ranks of  free riders as it began to catch up with 
the West and posed a growing competitive challenge to American supremacy 
in manufacturing. During the 1980s, Japan emerged as the top “unfair bur- 
densharer” as it transformed into an  economic, financial, and technological 
superpower and threatened America’s supremacy in high  finance and high 
technology. Meanwhile, the United States maintained economic growth and 
rising living standards by borrowing huge sums from overseas-a  large chunk 
of it from Japan-and  turned almost overnight into “the world’s largest debtor 
nation.”’ Consequently, the perception heightened that Japan had taken a free 
ride to economic supremacy at the expense of America, which is lying flat on 
its back under the burden of defending its economic adversaries.8 
Japan, however, posed a unique conundrum to the applicability of the con- 
cept  of  burdensharing. Having renounced war  and  aggression in  its  1947 
“peace constitution” after massive death and destruction and a humiliating de- 
feat in World War 11,  in  1976 Japan decided to limit its military (self-defense) 
spending to 1 percent of GNP. This nonaggressive military posture enjoys im- 
mense support within Japan and abroad. With the United States devoting 5-6 
percent of its GNP to maintain its military superpower status, there is thus only 
one way Japan can eliminate its “defense burden deficit” and stop free riding: 
by  increasing its defense spending by  4-5  percent of GNP. While Japan has 
continued to increase host nation support for U.S. military bases, has extended 
its defense responsibility over sea-lanes to a distance of  1,000 nautical miles, 
6. See, for example, Bull (1964) and Pincus (1962). 
7. For a detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of America’s debtor status, see Islam 
8. This perception appears partly to explain the popularity of “the imperial overstretch” thesis 
(1988). 
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and is now participating physically in the United Nations peacekeeping force, 
it has long been considered virtually  impossible for Japan to increase its de- 
fense spending three- to fourfold. This is because neither the American secu- 
rity experts, nor the Japanese people, nor Japan’s  Asian neighbors think that 
rearming the rising sun even to a modest degree for the sake of  fairer bur- 
densharing will enhance global peace and security. 
This paradox by the late 1970s led to a reformulation of the goal: how to 
reduce Japan’s free ride without rearming it into a military-nuclear superpower. 
More recently, this reformulation has led to a redefinition of the global security 
burden: the burden now is not confined to military spending alone, but includes 
other “international public goods,” items such as development assistance, alle- 
viation of the Third World debt problem, international peacekeeping, preserva- 
tion of the environment, the fight against international terrorism and drug traf- 
ficking, prevention of international transmission of communicable disease, and 
Thus the reconstructed concept of burdensharing (or responsibility sharing, 
as more balanced and sophisticated observers correctly rephrase itlo) envisions 
a division of labor in global roles. In this “new world order,” the United States 
will continue to provide a security umbrella to Japan and other allies by car- 
rying “the burden of being the world’s only military superpower,” and Japan 
will  try  to match the costs of  maintaining  the  downsized but  still massive 
American military machine by spending huge sums on development assistance 
and other international public goods. Incidentally, the Gulf War appears to have 
broadened the scope of burdensharinglresponsibility sharing even further: now 
the presumption seems to be that if the United States fights a war, especially 
with a seal of approval from the United Nations Security Council, then Japan 
has a perfect one-shot opportunity to temporarily reduce its free ride by pick- 
ing up a large share of America’s war expenses. In other words, Japan in this 
post-Cold  War, post-Gulf  War world is to bear its fair share of the burden by 
paying for not only nonmilitary international public goods, but also wars that 
the  United  States  decides  to wage  to selectively defend  freedom and  de- 
mocracy. 
Many advocates of burdensharing seem to rest their case on essentially three 
propositions: (  1)  America’s relative  economic decline and Japan’s  economic 
prosperity  are  rooted  in  Japan’s  security  free ride  under  U.S.  protection. 
(2) U.S. national defense spending is an international public good in the con- 
text of not only NATO, but also the 1960 United States-Japan  mutual coopera- 
SO 
9. See McNamara (1992) and Peterson (1987). 
10. Burdensharing, by  construction, is a one-sided concept: it focuses solely on a hegemonic 
nation’s financial and human cost of assuming leadership of  a collective security arrangement, and 
ignores the power, privilege, and prestige that comes with it. By contrast, responsibility sharing is 
a more balanced concept because it recognizes the positive correlation between burden and power; 
that is, greater burdensharing will result in greater power sharing. The adherents of the burdenshar- 
ing school appear to avoid the issue of power sharing. 325  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
tion and security treaty. (3) Japanese ODA is also an international public good 
and is highly substitutable for Japanese and American defense spending. The 
rest of this section argues that these presumptions rest on faulty foundations. 
The central argument supporting the first proposition runs as follows: while 
the United States devotes a disproportionately high share of national resources 
to military spending and thereby weakens its global competitive position by 
diverting resources away from productive investments, Japan, protected by the 
U.S.  security umbrella, spends little on defense and devotes freed-up resources 
to improving economic competitiveness, and thereby beats hands down its mil- 
itary protector in the international marketplace (see Harrison and Prestowitz 
1990). 
While this is not the place to settle this debate, I would simply stress that 
the alleged negative security-economics linkage has little empirical grounding; 
it is simply another example of the fallacy post hoc, ergo propter hoc. The 
proponents of this linkage are fully satisfied with the prima facie evidence that 
high-defense America appears to be losing its competitive edge to low-defense 
Japan. One wonders whether they really believe that if Japan spent 6-7  percent 
of its GNP on defense in the postwar period, it would have failed to catch up 
with the West and to attain its legendary manufacturing prowess. One can just 
as easily argue the opposite: with a high proportion of resources devoted to 
defense, Japan would have not only become an economic superpower; it could 
have also achieved what it does not have today-supremacy  in military tech- 
nology  and in  other areas where this  technology  and the associated R&D 
spending have  spillover effects (aviation, for example). The proponents also 
seem to forget that the United States reached new economic heights in the 
wake of two world wars while it devoted a much larger share of its GNP to 
military spending. During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States reached the 
peak of  its economic supremacy; these were also the years when the nation 
assumed  a  much  larger  burden  of  defense  as  compared  to  the  last  two 
decades." 
Looking around the Pacific, three out of the four so-called Asian dragons- 
Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea-devote  a much larger proportion of 
GNP to defense than does Japan. (Hong Kong is a British colony where the 
resource allocation statistics are either unavailable or messy and difficult to 
interpret.) If  high defense spending did not stop Taiwan-a  small island with 
no history of past glory and power-from  achieving economic prosperity, one 
may  wonder why it should have  stopped Japan-the  only Asian country to 
have  approached the level of  industrial development of the Western nations 
before World War  I-from  emerging as an economic superpower. Having 
1 I. One can argue that the economic ills of the 1970s and 1980s are precisely the lagged effects 
of excessive defense spending of the earlier decades-effects  of diverting scarce resources to fight 
the Korean War,  the Vietnam War,  and above all the Cold War.  The available econometric and 
other empirical analyses offer mixed answers. For  an  analysis that  does not  support the above 
thesis, see Weidenbaum (1968). 326  Shafiqul Islam 
committed the sin of engaging in causal empiricism, let me absolve myself by 
referring to the higher authorities: the large and growing empirical literature 
on the subject turns up mixed evidence-there  is no clear-cut linkage between 
a country’s defense spending and its economic performance.’* A country’s sav- 
ing rate and other characteristics may influence this linkage significantly. In 
the case of Japan, at least one study found little evidence of the free ride con- 
tributing to its economic prosperity (Okimoto 1982). Thus it does not appear 
that America made a mistake by providing Japan military  protection-even 
without it, Japan would likely have emerged as an economic superpower. In- 
deed, those who fear Japan’s militarism may wish to find comfort in that the 
free ride has kept Japan from becoming a military superpower, and is likely to 
keep it from challenging America’s preeminence in the military sphere over 
the foreseeable future. 
The second presumption that the U.S.  and the Japanese defense contribu- 
tions to the United States-Japan  security treaty can be interpreted as internu- 
tionul public goods is fraught with a series of questionable assumptions.13 To 
begin with, it is difficult to statistically determine how much of the U.S. na- 
tional defense expenditure (and the Japanese national defense expenditure) is 
a contribution to the United States-Japan  security treaty (or the United States- 
Japan alliance, to use a term favored in the 198Os), and how much is not. Some 
observers implicitly assume both countries’ total national defense expenditures 
(America’s 5-6  percent of GNP defense burden and Japan’s 1 percent burden) 
to be their contributions to the alliance, while others view the estimated costs 
of the U.S. military presence in Japan (or in the Pacific) as America’s burden 
of defending Japan. Analytically the more significant issue, however, is that a 
hegemonic  nation’s  international  commitments  cannot be  neatly  separated 
from its national interest: America’s financial and human costs of assuming 
leadership  of  a collective security  arrangement  (NATO, the United  States- 
Japan security treaty, and so on) are precisely what bring it various economic, 
political, and psychic benefits. In other words, the burden that the United States 
seems increasingly unwilling-and  apparently unable-to  bear is the burden 
of  being  the superpower:  this  burden  forms the basis  of  America’s global 
power, prestige, and privilege. 
In the language of the theory of public goods, U.S. national defense at the 
international level is thus at best a mixed good with a dominant private good 
12. See, for example, Benoit (1973,  1978), Deger and Sen (1990), Faini, Annez, and Taylor 
(1984). and Kaldor (1978). 
13. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) did the seminal work where they analyzed common defense 
within an alliance as a public or collective good. Murakami and Kosai (1986, 34). among others, 
extended the concept of international public goods beyond common defense. More recently, Bal- 
assa and Noland (1988, 173) applied the concept of international public good to U.S.  and Japanese 
expenditures on defense and foreign aid: “The responsibilities of world leadership require Japan 
to take a more active role in the collective management system and in the provision of international 
public goods. In this chapter, we have examined two potential areas for action-military  security 
and assistance to developing countries.” 321  Foreign Aid  and Burdensharing 
feature. Put another way, defense produces joint products-these  may include 
anything from positive economic spillovers of military R&D spending to the 
ability to use the military to serve nonalliance national security objectives- 
that are not, or only partly, appropriable by  the members of the a1lian~e.l~  In 
addition to this obvious mixed good characteristic of  defense in the alliance, 
three other shortcomings of interpreting the U.S. or Japanese defense spending 
as international public goods are worth stressing. First, the widely accepted 
notion that defense at the national level is a pure public good is only partly 
accurate. For example, while the deterrence resulting from national defense 
can be viewed as a pure public good because it meets the nonrivalness and 
nonexclusion  riter ria,'^ the same cannot be said about defense when deterrence 
fails. This is because the instruments of defense will not protect all communi- 
ties and all regions within the country in the same way, thus failing the non- 
rivalness criterion.I6 
Second, the public good characteristic of defense when it is a contribution 
to an alliance such as NATO becomes even more diluted. Deterrence passes 
the nonrivalness test, but not the nonexclusion test, as one leading member 
(say,  the United States) can lower its  deterrence for a particular ally  (say, 
France) by  eroding the credibility of defense for that ally. If  deterrence fails 
and an attack ensues, neither criterion of  a pure public good is met. The de- 
fense in the wake of an attack from the common enemy fails the nonrivalness 
test as more attention to the security of its own citizens may prevent a member 
(say, the United States) from providing the same degree of protection to its 
NATO allies. It also fails the nonexclusion criterion. For example, the United 
States may give itself more protection than its European allies. 
Finally, the international public good feature of common defense is further 
diminished when it to comes to the United States-Japan  security treaty. For 
one, the treaty appears to have incorporated two separate objectives: to defend 
against the common enemy, the Soviet Union; and to ensure that Japan did not 
become  a  military  and  nuclear  superpower.  In  other  words,  part  of  the 
agreement was actually to ensure that one ally remained the military and nu- 
clear superpower by spending a lot on defense while the other one maintained 
limited national defense capability by  spending much less. Put another way, 
Japan’s  “military  free ride”  was  a mutually agreed-upon component of  the 
treaty because both parties saw it as serving their own national interests. 
While this mutually beneficial bargain is not explicitly stated in the treaty, 
14. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966,272) recognize this: “Another assumption in the model devel- 
oped in the foregoing section was that the military forces in an alliance provide only the collective 
benefit of alliance security, when in fact they also provide purely national, non-collective benefits 
to the nations that maintain them.” 
15. Nonrivalness  refers to the fact that one can consume a public good without reducing the 
amount consumed by  others. Nonexclusion means one cannot prevent others from consuming a 
public good even if they do not pay for it. See Samuelson (1954) and Head (1962). 
16. This paragraph and the next draw heavily on De Strihou (1967). 328  Shafiqul Islam 
it is implicitly referred to in Article 3, with a mention of constitutional pro- 
visions: “The Parties, individually and  in  cooperation with each other, by 
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and 
develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist and 
attack.” The significance of this seemingly innocuous reference to “constitu- 
tional provisions” becomes clear when one recalls chapter 2 of Japan’s consti- 
tution. 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
One interpretation of this treaty could be that the United States agreed to 
provide Japan a mixed good in exchange for a limit on Japan’s provision of a 
mixed good. Moreover, both the United States and Japan (and many of Japan’s 
Asian neighbors) continue to view a substantially enlarged Japanese defense 
capability as an “international public bad.”  Clearly many  security experts be- 
lieve that if one of the parties pulls out of this treaty-especially  in the context 
of deteriorating bilateral relations-Japan  will sharply increase its defense ex- 
penditure, starting an arms race in the region, and perhaps inducing the United 
States to respond by spending more. This brings out another interesting point: 
in the absence of an alliance, national defense of individual countries can be 
interpreted as partly an international public bad.  The central point, however, 
is that Japan’s low defense spending cannot be interpreted as a free ride, be- 
cause both the United States and Japan appear to believe it to be in their na- 
tional interest to limit Japan’s military spending, as both view significantly in- 
creased Japanese defense spending as an international public bad. 
The end of the Cold War does not invalidate the above arguments. With the 
disappearance of  the Soviet Union as the common enemy, NATO as well as 
the United States-Japan  alliance now face more than one “common enemy”- 
they are multidimensional, diffuse, and unpredictable (for example, future eth- 
nic wars within a nation or regional conflicts between two erstwhile friendly 
countries). All of this only weakens the argument that Japan is a free rider, as 
the face of  the common enemy becomes fuzzier and mutual need for con- 
taining a rise of militarism in Japan becomes greater. 
Finally, the GNP-share-based methodology to measure the burden and deter- 
17. This interpretation follows directly from the theory of externalities: without cooperation or 
public intervention, a public bad (pollution) will be overproduced. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966, 
272) mention this result without any reference to defense as a public bad: “Allied nations may be 
suspicious of one another, even as they cooperate in the achievement of common purposes, and 
may enlarge their military forces because of conceivable future conflicts.” 329  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
mine the bilateral burden imbalance assumes that defense and foreign aid-of 
the United States and of Japan-are  all highly substitutable international pub- 
lic goods. This is again a dubious assumption. Applying reasons already ad- 
vanced, one can see that the case for ODA as an international public good is 
even weaker: the political credit goes to Japan-and  not to other donors- 
and both the nonrivalness and nonexclusion criteria fail even more clearly. For 
example, Tokyo’s  aid to Thailand does not confer on the United States the 
same economic benefits as it does on Japan (nonrivalness fails), and Japan can 
partially exclude the United States from benefits of its foreign aid to Thailand 
(nonexclusion fails). ODA is thus a mixed good where its private good feature 
seems dominant. 
The practical problem arises from the way many observers treat U.S. defense 
spending and Japanese aid spending as perfect substitutes-a  clearly invalid 
presumption. When it comes to measuring a country’s burden, the share of 
GNP devoted to military spending is added to that devoted to other interna- 
tional public goods. 
Typically, the basket of other international public goods is reduced to one 
good-ODA  (McNamara 1992; Kosminsky and Fischer  1989; Pharr 1988; 
WIDER 1987). Thus the burden is often measured by adding the share of GNP 
spent on development aid to that spend on defense. Yamamura (1989, 229) 
sums up this approach succinctly: “The logical and realistic course for Japan 
is to increase its ‘sacrifice’ by sharply increasing its nonmilitary contributions 
to the alliance and to world peace-that  is, by increasing its official develop- 
ment assistance (ODA).” Robinson (1986, 8) presents his burden calculations 
as follows: “Japan could make a commitment sufficiently large that the world 
would have to take notice. How large? Well, what about $60 billion a year? 
Where did I get this figure? The United States spends about 6.5 percent of its 
GNP on defense and foreign aid. Japan spends about 1.5 percent of its GNP- 
5 percent less. Five percent of Japan’s $1.2 trillion GNP comes to $60 billion, 
or roughly Y11 trillion.” 
Making no distinction between one country’s military spending and anoth- 
er’s foreign aid spending, and the using combined spending on military and 
foreign aid as the measure of the burden, however, appears to make little eco- 
nomic, political, or even moral sense. For example, such an approach implies 
that if  America decides to spend 1 percent of  its GNP on “Star Wars,” then 
Japan is being a selfish free rider if it does not follow by allocating 1 percent 
of  its GNP to development assistance. Or that if  the United States spends 5 
percent of its GNP on defense and Japan spends only 1 percent, then the goal 
of  fair burdensharing dictates that Japan spend 3-4  percent of  its GNP on 
foreign aid or be doomed to the status of a free rider. In this view, the overriding 
objective is for Japan to spend some x percent of its GNP on some nonmilitary 
items; who gets the money and how it is used are less important. The following 
line of reasoning advanced by one prominent observer of United States-Japan 
relations, Yamamura (1989,231), is widely shared: 330  Shafiqul Islam 
Another reason to argue that even Takeshita’s seemingly ambitious goal for 
ODA in the 1988-1992 period is inadequate is that Japan’s military expendi- 
ture and ODA will remain significantly less than those of its Western allies 
(except Canada), which spend 4 to 6 percent of GNP for defense in addition 
to ODA. . . .  Therefore, if Japan provides ODA of $10 billion per year as 
projected by  the Takeshita proposal, it is still likely to be criticized by  its 
allies for failing to do its share. Given its GNP of nearly $2.5 trillion, ODA 
equivalent to 1 percent of Japan’s GNP (the amount needed to bring the sum 
of  the defense expenditure and ODA to 3 percent) would be $25 billion. 
This suggests that, even allowing for a steady increase in Japan’s military 
expenditure, many in the Western alliance are justified in demanding that 
Japan not only maintain the current pace of increase in its defense expendi- 
tures but also increase its ODA and other international contributions sub- 
stantially as soon as possible from the projected level of $10 billion to about 
$25 billion per year. 
The central point of  this section is not to question the need for Japan to 
assume greater global responsibilities; it is to challenge the conventional prem- 
ise and modalities for doing so. Japan should play a greater global role, but not 
because it should pick up a fair share of  its burden by compensating for its 
military free ride. There is a much more simple and compelling reason: Japan 
is a global economic superpower, and despite recent progress its global com- 
mitments and obligations  still fall far short of  its capacity  for undertaking 
global responsibilities. Since Japan is a nonnuclear pacifist power, and so far 
the international community on balance prefers it remain so, it seems sensible 
that Japan make contributions in nonmilitary areas by addressing the problems 
of poverty, economic underdevelopment, natural disasters, environmental deg- 
radation, and other transnational “common enemies.”’x 
While both U.S. and Japanese political leaders are increasingly using the 
term “global partnership” to characterize the bilateral relationship, an adequate 
and satisfactory elaboration of what this term means still seems to be lacking. 
In my view, the concept of global partnership or “collective responsibility shar- 
ing,” if properly defined and applied, can effectively deal with an increasingly 
unsustainable global imbalance causing much of the bilateral friction-the  im- 
balance between monetary might and military muscle of the world’s top two 
economic superpowers. A credible exercise of hegemonic leadership requires 
both monetary might and military muscle. As the Gulf War has demonstrated, 
if  a superpower assumes the burden of flexing its military muscle but lacks 
the monetary means, it runs the risk of becoming the world’s police-for-hire; 
similarly, if an economic and financial superpower unburdened with military 
18. In response to the U.S.  pressure-intensified  during the Gulf War-for  sweat and blood in 
addition to money, Japan  has also begun to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping force. 
Future historians may look back at this development as a first step toward Japan’s rearmament. The 
historical irony is that the country-the  United States-that  helped Japan  embrace pacifism after 
World War  I1 is the one that may turn  out to be responsible for pushing Japan  to break out of it 
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prowess tries to help with money alone, it risks becoming a push-button cash 
dispenser. 
The principle of  global partnership reduces these risks arising from this 
monetary-military imbalance. While burdensharing assumes that America is 
selflessly carrying the burden of defending freedom and peace, and that it is 
only fair that its allies share it (through military and monetary means), global 
partnership rests on the premise that promoting global peace and prosperity is 
the collective responsibility of the leading nations, and that they should exer- 
cise joint leadership within a multilateral framework and contribute jointly ac- 
cording to their respective national advantages. 
The underlying assumption here is that promoting global peace and prosper- 
ity is a responsibility-it  is a burden as well as a source of power and influ- 
ence-and  that since the world is dominated by a group of major powers, this 
responsibility has to be shared, although not necessarily equally. Nations with 
greater economic, military, and leadership capacity may shoulder more of the 
responsibility and consequently may project more power and influence. For 
example, with a chronic shortage of financial resources the United States is no 
longer the supreme superpower it was in the 1950s,  but it is still the only nation 
on earth that is both an economic and a military superpower. In other words, 
America is first among equals and thus is still the only power capable of being 
the leading, or senior, partner of a global partnership-or  the largest “share- 
holder” of collective responsibility. 
The principle of  global partnership thus implies that mechanical formulas 
involving dollar figures and GNP shares may not be the way to determine Ja- 
pan’s  monetary and other contributions to the global community; the nature 
and the magnitude of Japan’s contributions should be assessed on a case-by- 
case basis depending on the needs in a particular area relative to Japan’s capac- 
ity in meeting them. It also implies that America’s unilateralist instinct in do- 
minating multilateral organizations should be contained; the tendency to hold 
on to political power while prodding Japan to shoulder the ever-growing fi- 
nancial burden only erodes the credibility of American leadership and subverts 
the emergence of  a true United States-Japan  global partnership or of  a new 
world order promoting peace and prosperity.19 
8.3  How Unfair and Mercantilist Is Japanese Aid to Pacific Asia? 
Many of  America’s Japan experts believe that Japan provides low-quality 
aid  primarily  to  meet  its  own  commercial needs. For example, Hellmann 
(1989, 262) asserts: “Roughly 70 percent of  aid is tied-in  fact, if  not for- 
mally-to  the Japanese economy.” Pharr (1992, 18) says: “In all these [quality 
of  aid, grant element, terms, and portion of  grant to loan aid] areas, Japan 
repeatedly has been found wanting in OECD reviews”; however, she adds that 
19. For more details on the concept of  global partnership, see Islam (1991,216-24). 332  Shafiqul Islam 
“Japan is committed to making improvements.”20  Indeed, the view that Japan 
gives aid to serve its own narrow economic interests constitutes an important 
bridge between the theme of  global free ride and that of  an East Asia co- 
prosperity sphere. The purpose of this section is to see whether this bridge can 
take the weight of empirical evidence. 
It is useful to classify the myriad criticisms of Japanese development aid 
into two broad categories: unfair aid practices and aid mercantilism. I focus on 
two specific criticisms under the category of unfair aidpractices (low aid qual- 
ity): the share of grants in total ODA is too low, and the loans are not conces- 
sional enough; and too little aid goes to support “basic human needs” of  the 
poorest of the poor (too much goes to finance economic infrastructure). While 
overlapping indirectly with unfair aid practices, aid mercantilism subsumes the 
following specific criticisms: Japan makes extensive use of tied aid (limits aid 
money to procurement from Japan) and mixed credits (subsidizes sales of Japa- 
nese  goods by  spicing up  export credits with  concessional developmental 
loans) to boost exports; and it promotes Japanese high-technology sales with 
excessive focus on capital projects and physical infrastructure. 
Before trying to assess the empirical validity of these criticisms for Pacific 
Asia, it may be useful to address the criticism that Japan gives too little aid (low 
aid quantity) and most of it goes to Asia (inequitable geographical distribution) 
(Pharr 1988; Bloch 1991, 76). Table 8.1 reports the relevant aid data for the 
Group of Seven (G-7) countries. On aid volume, three points are worth empha- 
sizing. First, while in nominal dollar terms Japan replaced the United States as 
the top donor nation in 1989 for the first time in the “history of ODA” (ODA 
is a post-World  War I1 phenomenon with a very short history) before returning 
to the number two position in 1990, it had to provide only 0.3  1 percent of GNP 
to accomplish this feat. That is because the United States spent only 0.15 per- 
cent of its GNP on ODA in 1989 and was able to recapture its traditional top 
donor position in  1990 with a 0.21 percent of aid-to-GNP ratio. While 0.31 
percent of GNP looks pitifully small, Japan should not be singled out for being 
“stingy”: in 1990, two (the United States and the United Kingdom) of the other 
six major countries did worse, and one (Italy) did about the same. To put it the 
other way, only half of the other six did modestly better. Indeed, Japan’s 0.31 
percent of GNP contribution was only 0.04 percent less than the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) average of 0.35 percent. The issue here is not to 
argue that these numbers are necessarily adequate, but to point out that Japan 
is not behaving particularly differently from the other G-7 countries. 
The comparison with the Nordic countries that contribute a much higher 
percentage of  GNP to ODA is misleading because it ignores the enormous 
difference in economic size. For example, Norway contributes more than  1 
20. See also Pharr (1988). Pyle (1989). and Preeg (1989b). Yamamura’s (1989,230)  comment 
is typical: “Japanese ODA has been known for both its high proportion of tied loans and the high 
interest rates it charges.” Table 8.1  6-7 Countries, ODA Disbursements and Geographical Distribution 
Net Disbursements  Bilateral ODA: % of Gross Disbursements 
Latin 
Sub-Saharan  Other Asia  and  and 
Middle East  America 
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8,965  9,069 
7,676  11,366 
4,948  6,320 
5,162  6,571 
2,587  2,647 
3,613  3,395 
2,320  2,470 
46,712  54,017 
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0.44  0.44  41.1  53.4  35.3  14.1  4.9  12.0  7.6  6.7  11.1  13.9 
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Source: OECD (1991a) 
"Includes small amounts of ODA to southern Europe. 
bFor 1990, includes forgiveness of non-ODA military debt of $1.2 billion. 
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percent in GNP, but in 1989 it came to less than $1 billion; that year Japan’s 
GNP was more than thirty times that of Norway. If Japan’s net disbursement of 
ODA were 1 percent of GNP in 1989, it would have provided $30 billion. That 
sum is equal to the two-thirds of the 1989 total net DAC disbursement. It is not 
clear how Japan could have effectively disbursed such a huge volume of aid. 
Second, while avoiding a formal commitment to reach the United Nations 
target of 0.7 percent of GNP within a specified period of time, Japan pledged 
to “improve steadily the ratio of its ODA to GNP” in its Fourth Medium-Term 
Target of ODA announced in June 1988 (OECD 1991,12; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1990, 155). By contrast, the United States has rejected such a target and 
has made no commitment to increase its ODNGNP ratio. Given the domestic 
political and administrative constrains as well as the limited-and  slowly ex- 
pansive-absorptive  capacity of  the recipient countries, it  seemed until re- 
cently that Japan would be unable to raise its aid/GNP ratio substantially in the 
near future. With rising demand for official resources in some new  areas- 
especially environmental challenge in the Third World, opening up of Indo- 
china, and economic reform  and development of  nations (old and new) in 
central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union-a  window of oppor- 
tunity  has, however, opened for Japan  to  increase its contribution rapidly 
through bilateral as well as multilateral channels. 
Finally, without denying the role of additional external resources in promot- 
ing growth and development in the Third World, the important issue is not how 
to reach a magic quantitative target for aid: it is how to use the money effec- 
tively to promote equitable, environment-friendly, and self-sustaining develop- 
ment. Excessive focus on who gives what percentage of GNP can distract one 
from the real goal, which is how to employ foreign assistance as an effective 
catalyst in the development process and help the developing countries to help 
themselves. This point is particularly important in view of the fact that ODA 
so far seems to have been more successful in creating a growing ghetto of aid- 
addicted dependencies rather than in assisting countries to “graduate” and take 
off on a path of  sustainable development (Lele and Nabi 1990; OECD 1985; 
World Bank 1990, 127-37). 
Two observations are in order with regard to the criticism that Japanese aid 
is excessively concentrated in Asia. First, it is true that almost 70 percent of 
Japanese aid goes to Asia. But the intra-Asia distribution has changed dramati- 
cally during the 1980s-there  has been a shift away from South Asia toward 
Southeast Asia and China. For example, while the share of Japanese aid go- 
ing to South Asia has dropped from 33 percent in  1979/80 to  17 percent in 
1989/90, the share going to “other Asia and Oceania” (largely Southeast Asia 
and China) has risen from 41  percent to 53 percent (table 8.1). Before one 
jumps to the conclusion that Japan is diverting resources from poor South Asia 
to richer and getting-even-richer Southeast Asia to serve its own economic and 
commercial interests, it  should be noted that the absolute dollar volume of 
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shift has largely occurred due to a sharp rise in Japanese net aid disbursements 
to two countries: China and the Philippines (table 8.2). While Indonesia has 
remained the number-one recipient of Japanese aid, its share has actually de- 
clined over the 1980s. These countries are where much of the poor-not  only 
of Asia, but of the world-live.  This is one reason why despite this shift to the 
east from the south within Asia, Japanese share of aid to the least-developed 
countries has actually increased during the 1980s (table 8.6). It is also notewor- 
thy that the increase in Japanese aid to the Philippines has been very much in 
response to the U.S. request for support of the military bases there and to the 
overall American (and Japanese) security interests in Pacific Asia. Increased 
aid to China reflects U.S.-Japanese interests in fostering market reforms there 
as well as the Japanese goal of  improving relations with Beijing. And it is 
essentially a continuation of an old policy to expand dollar volume aid to Indo- 
nesia, the poorest and most populous country in Southeast Asia, where Japan’s 
energy policy interests mesh well with its developmental goals. 
Second, there is no economic logic why a donor should distribute its ODA 
more or less equally among various geographical regions of  the world. An 
appeal for a better balance in distribution in terms of  sectors (say, physical 
infrastructure versus basic human needs), or income levels (middle-income 
versus low-income countries), or allocation channels (bilateral versus multilat- 
eral) is at least more compelling, though not necessarily convincing. On geo- 
graphical distribution, however, one can sensibly reason that bilateral aid is 
likely to be more effective if it is allocated in areas with which the donor coun- 
try has close historical, political, and economic relationships, and where it is 
more familiar with and knowledgeable about the nature of local institutions, 
values, and attitudes. Indeed, this is the norm among the major donor coun- 
tries: the British and the French allocate most of  their bilateral aid to their 
former colonies. Once again Japan is no different in this respect, except that 
none of its major aid recipients is its former colony, although Japan had colo- 
nial ambitions toward some of them before the Second World War. 
Interestingly, the United States is the outlier here whose security interests 
dominate its regional and country allocation of aid (table 8.1). Almost half of 
U.S. aid goes to the Middle East and North Africa, with 30 percent allocated 
to two countries out of politicallsecurity motivations: in  1989/90, 17 percent 
of its aid was allocated to Egypt and 12 percent to Israel (a high-income coun- 
try with the 1989 per capita income of $9,790). While the share of those two 
countries in U.S.  aid has declined, in 1989/90, they received more economic 
aid than all countries of  Latin America and the Caribbean combined (20.5 
percent). 
Having questioned the economic logic of  criticizing Japanese aid’s Asian 
concentration, it is useful  to point  out that Japan is poised to become the 
world’s top donor nation and remain so over the foreseeable future. That means 
the geographical distribution of Japan’s aid can no longer be dictated by eco- 
nomic logic alone: political, security, and other considerations will begin to Table 8.2  Net Disbursements of ODA to Asia, Japan and the United States (millions of 
U.S. dollars) 
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shape Japan’s national and regional aid allocation. This implies not only some 
equitable geographical distribution of Japanese aid, but also future shifts in the 
distribution within Asia and around the globe. For example, Indochina and 
central Asian republics of  the former Soviet Union are likely to become in- 
creasingly important recipients of  Japanese economic assistance, and some 
Latin American nations, say, Brazil and Mexico, may receive substantial envi- 
ronmental aid. 
Having dealt with two global criticisms of Japanese aid, we can now turn to 
assessing the empirical validity-in  Pacific Asia-of  the criticisms summa- 
rized earlier. But before doing so, it would be useful to look at the evolution of 
Japanese and U.S. aid to the developing countries of Asia as a whole. Table 8.2 
reports dollar figures for net disbursements of Japanese and American ODA to 
developing Asia. The numbers reveal several interesting facts. First, the much 
talked-about phenomenon of Japanese aid driving trade and investment in the 
four Asian NIEs-South  Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-if  pres- 
ent earlier, certainly ceased to exist by the 1980s. This is because since 1980 
Japan has given little or no aid to these countries. Therefore, the oft-discussed 
aid-trade-investment linkages with Japan only apply to the four ASEAN coun- 
tries and China. This is well known yet often forgotten in a broad discussion 
of these linkages in East or Pacific Asia.z’ 
Second, as regards the rest of  developing Asia, South Asia is the largest 
recipient of  Japanese aid. Indochina receives very little at this moment, but 
given the recent Cambodian settlement and Vietnam’s market reforms, this re- 
gion can soon become a major absorber of Japanese development assistance. 
Third, even the raw dollar figures on the destination of Japanese aid money 
seem to contradict the view that Japan’s aid program is driven only by  commer- 
cial motives. For example, until recently Japan had provided substantial sums 
of  aid to Myanmar. This has a lot more to do with the history of Japan’s rela- 
tions with Myanmar than with profit motive of Japanese companies. Similarly, 
private business interests do not explain Japanese aid to Bangladesh; develop- 
ment and humanitarian considerations do. 
Finally, the United States is no match for Japan when it comes to develop- 
ment aid in Asia. Among ASEAN countries, the Philippines is the only country 
to receive substantial U.S. aid, although it is still less than half of Japanese aid 
disbursement. South Asia is the only other region where the United States has 
a significant presence, but it also gets more than double the U.S. aid from 
Japan. A closer look reveals that Pakistan and Bangladesh account for the lion’s 
share of U.S. aid to South Asia. In 1991, however, the United States suspended 
all aid to Pakistan. All this boils down to a striking observation: the United 
States provides  nontrivial  amounts of  development assistance to  only two 
21. For example, Katzenstein and Rouse (chap. 6 in this volume) assert: “Japanese business 
and government elites view ASEAN (and the NICs) as one economy, requiring a comprehensive 
perspective on aid, trade, and investmeht. The provision of the necessary infrastructure . . . will 
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countries in Asia-the  Philippines and Bangladesh. And both of these coun- 
tries receive from Japan more than double what the United States provides. 
Experts on United States-Japan  relations often talk enthusiastically about 
the potential for United States-Japan  aid cooperation in Pacific Asia (for ex- 
ample, CSIS 1991). One cannot help wondering, however, how Japan can co- 
operate with the United States in an area where the United States has little 
presence. With withdrawal of military bases, the Philippines may not even re- 
main an exception for too long, as U.S. aid to that country is likely to dry up 
as well. With little U.S. aid going to Pacific Asia, United States-Japan  aid 
cooperation in that region may remain alive only in conference rooms filled 
with United States-Japan  relations experts. 
The purpose of table 8.2 is partly to identify the major Asian recipients of 
Japanese development aid. The rest of  this section will focus on those coun- 
tries, namely, four ASEAN countries, five South Asian countries (India, Paki- 
stan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal), and China. Although this paper is 
concerned with Pacific Asia, the data on South Asia will serve as a point of 
reference and comparison, especially vis-i-vis the United States. Also, when- 
ever possible, Japan’s performance will be compared with that of the United 
States or that of  the DAC donors, so that Japan’s behavior is assessed not 
against an absolute standard but against the existing U.S. or international norm. 
Table 8.3 reports Japanese and U.S. aid to ASEAN, South Asia, and China 
in shares of total ODA these countries receive from the DAC members. The 
data confirm the increasing dominance of Japan in the regions’ aid arena, ac- 
companied by a shrinking American role. As early as 1980, Japan dwarfed the 
United States as an aid donor to the region. For example, while Japan ac- 
counted for almost half of the DAC aid going to ASEAN countries, the U.S. 
share was only 15 percent. The gap widened by the end of the 1980s. The only 
exception is Pakistan, where the share of U.S. aid rose during the 1980s. But 
that reflected U.S. response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
By the end of the 1980s, two-thirds of the DAC aid going to ASEAN came 
from Japan, while the U.S. share dropped below 10 percent. The Japanese aid 
share in South Asia rose one-third. The U.S. share in South Asia remained at 
about  15 percent, thanks to the temporary Afghanistan bonanza to Pakistan; 
the share of  U.S. aid in every other country of  South Asia fell. Finally, the 
Japanese share of aid to China rose from one-fifth to a peak of three-fourths in 
1986, and has since declined to about a half by  the end of  the decade. It is 
worth noting that the United States does not give any aid to China. 
With this preliminary review of the trend and pattern of Japanese and U.S. 
aid to Asia, we can now try to assess the specific criticisms of Japanese aid. 
Within the category of unfair aid practices, we begin with the criticism that the 
quality of Japanese development assistance is low because the share of  grants 
in it is “too low” and ODA loans charge excessively high interest rates. For Table 8.3  Net Disbursement of ODA to Asia, Japan and the United States (percentage of 
total net ODA from DAC countries) 
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example, according to Pyle (1989,51), “The quality of aid has been low: Japan 
gave away less and lent more on tougher terms than most other donors.” 
Table 8.4 confirms that the share of grants in Japanese ODA is indeed low, 
although the country-specific shares vary a great deal from year to year. For 
example, the grant ratio for Indonesia was 17 percent in 1980, rose to 47 per- 
cent in 1985, declined to 13 percent in 1989, and rose to 19 percent in 1990. 
These variations, however, do not obscure the low grant shares: in  1990 the 
grant ratio was about 25 percent for ASEAN, 45 percent for South Asia and 
30 percent for China. These figures contrast sharply with grant shares of 90 to 
100 percent for other major donors, including the United States. 
A sole focus on the grunt ratio, however, is somewhat misleading. A better 
measure of the overall degree of concessionality of ODA is the average grunt 
element, which takes into account the interest rate, grace period, and maturity 
of all loans. By definition, the grant element of a grant is 100 percent, whereas 
the grant element varies from loan to loan even for the same donor. Table 8.5 
reports the average grant element of ODA for Japan, the United States, and the 
DAC countries as a group (unfortunately,  similar data on the grant element for 
specific Asian countries are not available). Two points are worth highlighting. 
First, while the Japanese grant element is lower than that of the United States 
and the DAC countries, the difference is insignificant when it comes to the 
least-developed countries. In other words, Japan takes into account the income 
levcis of the recipient countries in  determining the concessionality of  its aid 
across countries, and this is reflected in Japan’s aid to the poorest countries, 
which is as concessional as aid provided by the United States and other donors. 
Table 8.4  Net disbursements of Japanese ODA Grants 
Grant Ratio (% of Japan’s Total 
ODA)  Grants (millions of  US.  dollars) 



















































552  25  36  28  24 
167  17  47  13  19 
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152  25  51  41  41 
68  26  46  50  35 
91  67  17  51  52 
47  83  80  74  85 
20  1  75  11  20  28 
1,145  30  33  29  29 
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Table 8.5  Grant Element of ODA, 1989-90 (percentage) 
United 
Japan  States  Total DAC 
Grant element of 
total ODA  81.2  98.8  92.8 
ODA loans  59.8  63.1  58.6 
ODA to least- 
developed countries  96.8  98.9  97.8 
Grant equivalent of 
ODA (% of GNP)  0.27  0.19  0.35 
Source: OECD (1991a). 
Nores: Grant element figures are based on ODA commitments data, excluding debt reorganization. 
Grant equivalent figures are calculated on a gross disbursement basis. 
The  figure for total DAC excludes several member countries for which data are not available. 
Second, while the grant equivalent of Japan’s ODA in percentage of GNP is 
lower than that of the DAC countries as a group, it is higher than that of  the 
United States. Put more simply, when all is said and done, Japan contributes a 
higher percentage of  GNP to concessionality-adjusted aid  than the United 
States does. The point once again is that, if the Japanese quantity of  “quality- 
adjusted” aid is low relative to its economic capacity, that of the United States 
is even lower. 
More important, the share of grants in total ODA or even the grant element 
per se says little about the quality of aid. Whether a particular project should 
be financed by  grants or loans depends on the nature of  the project. There is 
no reason why a commercially near-viable fertilizer factory should be financed 
by grants, and there is every reason to provide grants for a primary school or a 
health center. Also, given the differences in development requirements, a low- 
income country is likely to be a candidate for a higher share of grants than a 
middle-income country. The World Bank does not give any grants; that does 
not lower the quality of its aid. The quality of development assistance depends 
on its effectiveness in promoting self-sustaining development and not on some 
mechanical mix of  grants and loans. If  the leading bilateral donors believe 
grants are always better than loans, that does not make it necessarily right. 
The preference for loans over grants in its development assistance program 
also reflects Japan’s own growth experience as well as its development philoso- 
phy,  that the most effective way  to help countries to help themselves onto a 
path of  sustainable development is not to get them addicted to an unending 
flow of foreign charity, but to pressure them to build up their productive capac- 
ity in a financially responsible way. This does not mean that the Japanese aid 
authorities believe that development assistance should be provided in terms of 
loans at market rates. They understand full well that the developing countries 
can boost their economic growth rates with the help of grants and concessional 
loans, as these foreign resources typically finance projects that private capital, 342  Shafiqul Islam 
foreign or domestic, will not touch (economic and social infrastructure-from 
roads and bridges to schools and hospitals), and yet are critical to promoting 
productive capacity and productivity. A case for concessional aid can also be 
made on the ground of  low total factor productivity of developing countries, 
and in some situations, of raising consumption of basic necessities of the poor. 
As table 8.5 illustrates, Japan’s aid program reflects these considerations. While 
one can question the appropriateness of  loans for a particular project, or the 
mix of grants and loans for a particular country, there is little economics behind 
the view that the “quality” of loans is by definition lower than that of  grants. 
Finally, Pyle’s assertion notwithstanding, Japan does not lend on tough terms: 
in 1990, Japan’s ODA loans carried an average interest rate of 2.5 percent (Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs 1991). 
One of the more defensible global indicators of quality of aid is the propor- 
tion of  aid allocated to the poorest countries. On this criterion, the quality of 
Japan’s aid is higher than that of the United States. In  1988-89, Japan allocated 
70 percent of its aid to low-income countries, whereas the United States gave 
them a little over 46 percent (table 8.6). Japan also gave more of its aid to the 
least-developed countries than the United States did (20 percent as opposed to 
17 percent), but both countries fell below the DAC average of  25 percent. 
Given all the criticisms of Japanese bilateral aid, it is also noteworthy that 
Japan gives on average a greater share of  aid to multilateral institutions than 
do the United States and the DAC countries. 
The other major unfair aid practice Japan is accused of is that it spends too 
much aid money on economic infrastructure and large industrial projects, and 
not enough on social infrastructure and “basic human needs” (BHN). Detailed 
data to adequately assess this criticism in the case of Pacific Asia are not avail- 
able. However, the 1989 data on sectoral distribution of aid put together by the 
DAC can throw some light (table 8.7). First, the proportion of its total ODA 
(  18 percent) Japan allocated to social and administrative  infrastructure (educa- 
tion, health, water supply, etc.) in  1989 was not much lower than what the 
United States (19 percent) or the World Bank (19 percent) allocated; but all 
three donors fell below  the DAC average of  26 percent. Since there is no 
widely accepted definition of what constitutes aid for BHN, if we assume the 
Table 8.6  Aid to Multilateral Institutions and Poor Countries, Japan and the 
United States (net disbursement as percentage of total ODA) 
Multilateral  Low-Income  Least-Developed 
Institutions  Countries  Countries 
1983-84  1988-89  1983-84  1988-89  1983-84  1988-89 
Japan  35.5  27.1  66.2  69.5  18.6  19.6 
United States  28.5  23.7  53.4  46.4  16.6  16.6 
All DAC countries  26.9  23.5  56.7  57.5  21.7  24.7 
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Table 8.7  Uses of Aid, Japan and the United States, 1989 (percentage of total 
ODA commitments) 
Japan  United States” 
Social and administrative infrastructure  17.5  19.2 
Education  5.8  4.6 
Health and Population  2.6  7.2 
Planning and public administration  0.8  2.1 
Other (including water supply) 





Industry, mining, and construction 






Emergency aid (other than food aid) 
Administrative expenses 
Unspecified plus support to private volunteer, 
agencies 
8.4  5.2 
31.7  2.7 
19.3  1.2 
6.3  1.4 
6.0  0 
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6.6  0.3 
0.3  4.3 
1.8  0.1 
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0.6  19.0 
0.1  1.7 
3.4  5.8 












































~  ~ 
Source: OECD (1990). 
&I988  data. 
social and administrative structure is a close proxy for BHN, then one has 
to conclude that to the extent Japan is guilty of  neglecting BHN, the United 
States is too.22  Second, the striking difference shows up in economic infrastruc- 
ture: in 1989, Japan spent 32 percent of its aid money on transport, communi- 
cation, energy, and other physical infrastructure projects, whereas the U.S. al- 
location was meager, less than 3 percent. The DAC average share was about 
19 percent. Interestingly, Japan behaved more like the World Bank (which also 
allocated 32 percent of its funds to economic ‘infrastructure)  than other bilat- 
eral donors. The biggest outlier was not Japan, but the United States. It is also 
22. Counting food aid or assistance for agricultural production as BHN aid is questionable. 
Indeed, the concept of human development is perhaps more useful than that of BHN in the context 
of development aid. United Nations Development Program (1991, 13)  defines human development 
in the following way:  “The real objective of development is to increase people’s development 
choices. Income is one aspect of these choices-and  an extremely important one-but  it is not 
the sum-total of human existence. Health, education, a good physical environment and freedom- 
to name a few other components of  well being-may  be just as important. . . . A healthy, well 
nourished, well educated and skilled labor force is the best foundation for growth. . . .  People must 
be at the center of human development. . .  .  It [development] has to be development ofthe people, 
by the people,for the people.” 344  Shafiqul Islam 
noteworthy that almost 20 percent of U.S. assistance was food aid. This aid 
item, however, is designed to assist U.S. farmers and not so much the devel- 
oping countries; indeed numerous studies have shown that food aid-while 
desperately needed in situations of famine and natural disaster-if  provided 
routinely may adversely affect food production in the developing c~untries.’~ 
These data on sectoral distribution of aid do not, however, settle the issue of 
whether Japan’s aid program pays too little attention to BHN and too much to 
economic infrastructure, because they do not tell us what the right mix is. The 
data show that the Japanese aid allocation to economic infrastructure signifi- 
cantly exceeds “the DAC norm”-although  not the World Bank norm-and 
the divergence on social infrastructure is less pronounced. These observations 
raise questions that the data cannot answer: what reason is there to believe that 
the DAC norm represents the right mix of aid allocation, and why does each 
donor country have to have that same mix? It makes more sense to argue that 
with donors as a group coordinating their aid programs to maximize global 
development goals, each individual donor should design its aid program ac- 
cording to its own strengths and weaknesses. For example, while Japan should 
do its part in the area of social infrastructure, there is no reason why it cannot 
allocate a greater share of aid to economic infrastructure if it is relatively more 
effective in that sector. A much more important issue is how closely that aid is 
responding to the development priorities of individual recipient countries and 
how effectively the aid resources are being utilized. 
Japan is routinely accused of aid mercantilism. Simply put, the proposition 
runs as follows: while the United States sacrifices its national economic inter- 
ests at the altar of humanitarian considerations and global security concerns by 
providing untied aid to the developing countries, commercial interests motivate 
mercantilist Japan to provide tied aid, which primarily benefits Japan’s private 
sector in its drive to promote exports and gain market shares in the recipient 
countries.24  An  adequate assessment of  this proposition requires breaking it 
into several empirically verifiable components. 
The first verifiable element is the assertion that Japan relies heavily on tied 
aid, whereas the United States and other leading donors do not. The data on 
tied aid collected by the DAC, however, suggest otherwise: Japan’s aid is less 
tied than that of the DAC members as a group, while U.S. aid is more tied than 
the DAC average (table 8.8). For example, in 1989 only 17 percent of Japanese 
23. For instance, World Bank (1986, 146-47)  state: “The quantity of food aid is more closely 
related to the needs of donors than those of recipients. For example, U.S. legislation on food aid- 
Public Law 480-makes  explicit mention of  foreign policy considerations, surplus disposals, and 
the avoidance of  conflict between commercial and concessional exports. Donors give food aid as 
a convenient way of disposing surplus stocks, particularly of milk products.. .  . Food aid is also 
provided to supplement domestic production in normal  times. As a result, domestic prices may 
fall, discouraging local production and reducing farm profits.” 
24. See, for example, Phw (1988). Bloch (1991). Hellmann (1989). and Preeg (1989b. 179; 
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Table 8.8  Tied Aid, Bilateral ODA, Japan and the United States (percentage of 
total ODA) 
1982-83  1989 
(gross disbursements)  (commitments) 
United  United 
Japan  States  Total DAC  Japan  States  TotalDAC 
Fully tied”  17.1  30.3  30.0  13.8  40.2  33.0 
Partially tiedb  15.7  10.7  1.2  3.0  17.5  5.6 
Fully and partially tied  32.8  41.0  37.2  16.8  57.7  38.6 
Source: OECD (1991a, 1990, 1985). 
“Mainly aid tied to procurement in the donor country; also includes amounts available for procure- 
ment in several countries, but not widely enough to qualify as “partially untied.” 
bContributions available for procurement from donor and substantially all developing countries. 
bilateral aid was fully and partially tied, whereas the DAC group average of 
the proportion of tied aid was almost 40 percent. By contrast, the United States 
fully and partially tied 58 percent of its bilateral aid. Also note that while Japan 
cut back its reliance on tied aid during the 1980s, the United States seems to 
have headed in the opposite direction: Japan’s tied aid ratio fell from 33 percent 
in 1982-83  to 17 percent in 1989; during the same period the U.S. ratio rose 
from 41 percent to 58 percent. 
The adherents of “the Japanese aid mercantilism school” find these DAC 
data unpersuasive: they argue that though de jure Japan’s aid is no longer heav- 
ily tied, de facto it is so. In this view, with the Japanese private sector playing 
an active role in identifying and implementing aid projects, much of the offi- 
cially untied aid turns into tied aid in practice.25  Some light can be thrown on 
this issue by the data collected by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
the nationalities of procurement contractors of Japanese ODA loans (table 8.9). 
The evidence suggests that while the de facto tying thesis was largely valid 
during the early eighties, it was no longer valid by  1990. While Japanese firms 
obtained 63 percent of the procurement contracts generated by untied Japanese 
ODA loans in  1983, their share dropped to 20 percent by  1990. During the 
same period, the procurement share of the contractors from the developing 
countries rose from less than 30 percent to 55 percent, and that of the contrac- 
tors from the other DAC countries increased from 10 percent to 25 percent. 
That only 20 percent of the untied ODA loan contracts went to Japanese firms 
in 1990, if true, is actually remarkable: even without any tying and subsidy in 
their favor, one would expect the strongly competitive Japanese firms to do 
much better than 20 percent in open and free competition in markets they are 
greatly familiar with. 
25. For example, Pharr (1992, 16) states: “The real issue today is defacto tying that results from 
the informal role played by the Japanese private sector abroad in lobbying Third World govern- 
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Table 8.9  Procurement Share of Japanese ODA Loans by Nationalities of 
Contractors (percentage, contract basis) 
1983  1985  1987  1988  1989  1990 
United ODA loans 
Japan  63  52  37  27  25  20 
Developing countries  28  33  48  51  48  55 
Other DAC countries  9  15  15  22  27  25 
Total ODA loans 
Japan  70  68  55  43  38  27 
Other DAC countries  6  8  10  16  21  21 
Developing countries  24  24  35  41  41  52 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Note: The data are for Japanese fiscal years (April 1 to March 31). 
Estimates available from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) sup- 
port these conclusions. For example, the GAO reckons that the United States 
ties its aid far more tightly than Japan does: it estimates that in 1987 the share 
of fully and partially tied aid in total bilateral ODA was 48 percent for Japan 
and was over 90 percent for the United States. On procurement, the GAO cal- 
culations imply that, in 1987, about 60 percent of Japanese bilateral ODA was 
spent on Japanese goods and services, while the U.S. ratio was about 70 per- 
cent.26  Even these statistics do not persuade the critics, who argue that many 
of those so-called developing country contractors are nothing but fronts for the 
Japanese firms. The critics, however, do not feel it is necessary to go beyond 
citing one or two anecdotes from Thailand or Indonesia to convince themselves 
and others of  what the Japanese are really up to (see Preeg  1991, 115-16; 
Bloch 1991,72; Orr 1990,62). 
Another way to assess the empirical validity of the proposition that the Japa- 
nese government and business work hand in glove in using ODA to promote 
exports is to look for such a linkage in the data on Japanese aid and exports to 
the region. Opting for simplicity, I propose that, if  aid were indeed playing 
a significant role in promoting Japanese exports to Pacific Asian developing 
countries, we would expect the following: (1) countries that receive the largest 
volumes of Japanese aid tend to be the ones where Japan also exports the most; 
and (2) countries that are top recipients of  Japanese aid, and/or have  been 
blessed with the fastest increase in Japanese aid, are where the United States 
has the smallest markets, and/or has been least successful in expanding ex- 
ports. Once again, none of this discussion has any relevance for the NIEs be- 
26. See U.S. GAO (1990). The U.S. procurement ratio is lower than the tied aid ratio because 
some of the aid is only partially tied and the data modestly overstate the tying of U.S. aid. The 
fact remains, however, that in 1987 a higher fraction of U.S. aid was used to buy U.S. goods and 
services than was the case for Japan. And 1987 was not the first year when that happened; as early 
as 1982-83,  the United States was more guilty of tied aid than Japan was. 347  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
cause they currently receive little or no aid from Japan: East Asia or Pacific 
Asia really boils down to five countries-four  ASEAN countries and China. 
The data on Japanese ODA and exports to those countries and South Asia 
seem to contradict the above two implications of the aid-driving-trade thesis 
(table 8.10). 
First, the top three current recipients of Japanese aid are Indonesia, China, 
and the Philippines, whereas the top three markets for Japanese exports are 
China, Thailand, and Malaysia. During  1989-90,  Japan’s annual average aid 
flow to Indonesia was $1 billion with annual exports averaging $4.2 billion; by 
contrast Japan exported on average $8 billion to Thailand, which received only 
$450 million in aid. China-the  number-two recipient of  Japanese aid and 
number-two market for Japanese exports-seems  to fit the aid-driving-trade 
model; but with a per capita income of less than $400 and a very antiJapan 
communist regime, this is not the country the critics think of when they accuse 
Japan of building a coprosperity sphere with interlocking wheels of aid, trade, 
and investment. The Philippines also poses a contradiction: it was the third 
largest recipient of  Japanese aid in  1989-90  yet provided a strikingly small 
market for Japanese exports ($2.4 billion)-about  the same as captured by the 
United States. Bangladesh adds yet  another question mark to the thesis that 
Japan’s aid is commercially motivated: Japan offered the fifth largest share of 
its total ODA to one of the world’s poorest countries in return for about $370 
million of exports. 
Second, the top three largest and/or fastest growing markets for U.S. exports 
are China, Malaysia, and Thailand. Two of these countries-China  and Thai- 
land-are  also top recipients of  Japanese aid, and all three of  them are top 
markets for Japanese exports. Note also that, though the United States gives 
little aid to the region, during 1977-90,  US. exports to China and the Philip- 
pines grew faster than Japanese exports, at only a slightly lower pace for the 
other three ASEAN countries. By contrast, Japanese exports grew a bit faster 
than U.S. exports in South Asia-not  a region where Japanese aid is supposed 
to be acting in full force to promote exports. The picture that seems to emerge 
from all this is that, aid or no aid, markets for foreign goods are growing rap- 
idly in these countries, and Japan as well as the United States is benefiting 
from this boom. 
Another simple way of examining the Japanese aid-trade linkage is to take 
a close look at the behavior of  the ratios of  Japanese exports to aid across 
time and countries, vis-his the United States. One can propose three null 
hypotheses. (1) If Japan gives aid primarily to promote exports, then one would 
expect it to provide most aid to those countries where its exportdaid ratios are 
the highest, that is, where for each dollar of aid, the exports gains are the great- 
est. (2) If  it is also true that Japanese exporters use tied aid to enter a new 
market and establish a foothold from which to expand market shares, then one 
would expect the exports aid ratio to rise over time. (3) Even assuming away 
possible competitive advantages of  Japanese exporters over their American Table 8.10  Trade and Aid, Japan and the United States in Asia (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Change 1977-90 
Japan  United States  (%I 
United 
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Sources: OECD (1992, 1991b, 1988, 1982),IMF(1991, 1984, 1980) 
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Table 8.11  Exports/Aid Ratio in Asia, Japan and the United States (ratio of donor 
exports to net ODA disbursement) 
Japan  United States 
1977  1980  1985  1989  1990  1977  1980  1985  1989  1990 
ASEAN-Four  20  13  9  8  10  14  33  23  34  35 
Indonesia  12  10  14  3  6  7  13  18  41  61 
Malaysia  29  31  17  51  15  187  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Philippines  36  18  4  6  4  10  40  10  11  10 
Thailand  26  10  8  14  22  64  79  35  74  100 
South Asia  I  5  8  4  4  57  7  8  10 
China  N.A.  N.A.  32  10  8  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: OECD (1992, 1991b, 1988, 1982); IMF (1991, 1984, 1980). 
N.A. = not applicable; net ODA disbursement was negligible, zero, or negative. 
counterparts, one would also expect the U.S.  exports/aid ratios on balance to 
be lower than those for Japan. 
Exportdaid ratios reported in table 8.11 exhibit a great deal of year-to-year 
and cross-country variations, casting doubt on the existence of any discernible 
relationship between aid and exports. Indeed, they seem to contradict the three 
implications of the presumed aid-trade linkage mentioned above. First, Indone- 
sia, China, and the Philippines-the  top three recipients of  Japanese aid- 
are characterized by Japanese exportdaid ratios that are lower than those for 
Malaysia and Thailand. Second, except for Thailand, these ratios seem to have 
declined since 1980. Finally, the U.S. exportdaid ratios for all these countries 
are much higher relative to Japan. In the framework of the aid-driving-trade 
thesis, this would imply that the United States is getting a much greater export 
bang for a buck spend on aid. The implication that the United States is generat- 
ing a much larger volume of exports for a dollar of aid relative to Japan, how- 
ever, casts doubt over the validity of a significant cause-and-effect linkage be- 
tween aid and exports, for Japan and for the United 
The evolution of Japan’s share of import markets of its major Pacific Asian 
aid recipients can provide further evidence on Japan’s aid mercantilism (table 
8.12). An increase over time of these import ratios would at least be consistent 
with, though by no means conclusive evidence of, the view that Japan is gain- 
ing market share with the use of  tied aid. The data show otherwise: Japan’s 
market shares since 1975 have largely remained steady, and in some cases (no- 
tably, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines) have actually declined. With no 
evidence of increasing market shares and no evidence of tied aid, one wonders 
27. This impressionistic evidence can be supplemented by  econometric analyses that test for 
the presumed causal effects of aid on the pattern of trade using a simple gravity model. Time 
constraint does not allow me to pursue this course at this time, but I hope to carry this out- 
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exactly what type of research is carried out by  those who continue to assert 
that Japan uses tied aid to gain market shares. 
I conclude this section by  briefly addressing the allegation that Japan’s aid 
program promotes capital goods exports by  financing capital projects with 
mixed credits. An April 1989 study by the U.S.  Export-Import Bank showed 
that American companies were losing $400-800  million in potential exports 
each year to Japan and other foreign competitors benefiting from mixed credits 
from their governments. In  May  1990, the U.S. Exim Bank and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (US.  AID) jointly announced a new 
$500 million program of mixed credits; aid money and export credits would 
be used together to promote export of American power plants, telecommunica- 
tions gear, construction equipment, and other capital goods to four countries 
where Japan is the top donor-Indonesia,  Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thai- 
land. The program was to use the Exim Bank’s “war chest” of $110 million in 
fiscal year 1990. 
According to the Exim Bank report to the Congress for fiscal year 1991, the 
bank used virtually all of the war chest grant authority appropriated by  Con- 
gress ($150 million). These transactions are expected to support $532 million 
in U.S. exports and include a commitment of $58 million in Economic Support 
Fund (ESF) money from U.S. AID. All this effort to offset an estimated loss of 
less than $1 billion (or even, say, $5 billion, assuming the Exim Bank severely 
underestimated the loss) in U.S. capital goods exports is for a country that 
exported $116 billion of  capital goods in  1990. It is also surprising that the 
Exim Bank appears very proud that their program is expected to raise U.S. 
capital goods exports by half a billion-that  is, by 0.4  percent of the U.S. 1990 
exports in that category. 
8.4  A Coprosperity Sphere? 
Unlike burdensharing and military free ride, the “Greater East Asia Co- 
prosperity Sphere” is a phrase that Americans did not coin; the Japanese did. 
Table 8.12  Japan’s Share in Merchandise Imports of Its Major Asian Aid 
Recipients (imports from Japan as a percentage of total imports) 
Changes 
1975  1980  1985  1987  1989  1990  1975-90 
ASEAN-Four  28  25  23  24  25  26  -2 
Indonesia  31  31  26  28  23  25  -6 
Malaysia  23  23  23  22  24  24  1 
Philippines  25  20  14  17  19  18  -7 
Thailand  32  21  26  26  30  31  -1 
South Asia  15  8  10  12  11  10  -5 
China  34  27  22  16  16  14  -  20 
Sources: OECD (1991b, 1988, 1982); IMF (1991, 1984, 1980). 352  Shafiqul Islam 
Japanese militarists and imperialists came up with this concept as early as 1919 
and popularized it to give a positive economic meaning to their military cam- 
paign in the 1930s to replace the European colonial domination over East Asia 
with their own (Stony 1979). The death and destruction the Japanese war ma- 
chine imposed on Asian countries in pursuit of this colonial goal transformed 
the term coprosperity sphere into a symbol of Japanese ruthlessness and steam- 
roller approach to establishing regional dominance. The recent return of this 
phrase to the discussion of Japan’s emerging economic relations with its Asian 
neighbors reflects this history. But it also constitutes yet another example of 
the problem of “damned if you do and damned if you don’t’’ that Japan often 
seems to face: while  some are accusing Tokyo for being a selfish free rider 
spending too little on foreign aid, others are indicting it for using aid money 
to build a coprosperity  sphere in Pacific Asia. Growing Japanese economic 
presence in East Asia is fueling the perception that since the 1980s Japan has 
begun to do by peaceful economic means what it could not do by violent mili- 
tary means during the 1930s. 
Dornbusch  (1989, 270) asserts, “The  Asian  co-prosperity  scheme  is the 
most likely option for Japan,” but the concept of a coprosperity sphere harks 
back to subservient economic, political,  and military relationships many  of 
today’s developing countries had with their European colonial masters before 
World War 11; those relationships do not describe Japan’s current economic and 
political interactions with the dynamic and vibrant economies of Pacific Asia. 
To begin with, it is useful to remind ourselves that, unlike the United States, 
Japan  does not project military  power in Asian  countries with which  it has 
economic relations. Indeed, while economic domination does lead to political 
influence,  in  an  ultimate  showdown, the  relative  leverage of  the  dominant 
country (Japan) is muted when it has no military power to back up its economic 
and political power. 
There are at least two  additional reasons why  coprosperity sphere is the 
wrong phrase to describe Japan’s relations with East Asia. First, Japan is not 
forcing its growing aid-trade-investment  linkages upon its Asian neighbors; 
these are two-way relations reflecting comparative advantage and the stages of 
development from which both sides are benefiting. If  that were not the case, 
these Asian economies would not be wooing and welcoming Japanese goods, 
services, capital, and technology. Clearly, the economic boom these countries 
are enjoying does not seem to indicate economic relations serving only Japan’s 
economic  interests. Incidentally, the only country performing  poorly  in this 
region is the Philippines, a country that ranks at the bottom within Southeast 
Asia in terms of its economic relations with Japan and one that has had a long 
colonial economic and military relationship with the United States. 
Second, the view that Japan is gradually consolidating its hold on its Asian 
neighbors in the sense that it is increasingly influencing their economic poli- 
cies and domestic politics is at best an unwarranted fear, and at worst an insult 
to the people of  these sovereign countries. These independent nations are no 353  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
longer the weak colonies of imperialist powers unable to thwart foreign domi- 
nation and assert sovereignty; they are some of the most dynamic economies 
of the world with highly proud people and powerful nationalist  governments 
guarding  against any possible  encroachment  on their  sovereignty. With  the 
memory of Japanese militarism still alive, they are specially sensitive to any 
hint of Japanese influence in their internal affairs. 
With these general remarks, let me turn to two interrelated specific theses 
advanced by some Japan watchers. One is that in the wake of the 1985 enduku 
(the yen appreciation)  triggered by the Plaza currency accord, the Japanese 
government  articulated a plan to use public resources (development finance, 
technical cooperation, and MITI planning) to help Japanese private capital and 
technology develop a regional East Asian  economy  to serve Japan’s current 
restructuring needs and its long-term global economic interests (Arase 1988, 
1991; Maidment  1989). The other related thesis is that Japan is developing 
neocolonial economic relationships with the East Asian economies, in particu- 
lar the ASEAN countries, where trade and investment flows primarily  serve 
Japan’s  economic  interests  and  not  the  development  requirements  of  the 
recipienthost countries (Smith and do Rosario 1990; Sinha 1982). 
One clear articulation of the thesis that Japan Inc. is implementing a plan to 
create and manage regional economic hegemony can be found in a survey arti- 
cle in  The Economist. It identifies a  1988 study by  the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA) and a series of MITI white papers released during the late 1980s 
as the official intellectual source of this new “Asian Industries Development 
(AID)” plan. In particular, the EPA study with a mouthful of a title, “Promoting 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in an International Economic Environ- 
ment Undergoing Upheaval: Towards the Contribution of an Asian Network,” 
is credited with formulating the goal of this plan: to integrate the East Asian 
economies into a greater Japan Inc. According to the Economist piece (Maid- 
ment 1989, 11-13), 
Industrial policy would be coordinated from Tokyo. The EPA study talks of 
this being done by something it dubs the “Asian Brain.” This would control 
the disposition of industrial investment throughout Japan, the NICs and the 
new NICs and co-ordinate the necessary policy support by the governments 
of those countries. The ‘Asian Brain” is clearly intended to be the Japanese 
civil service, just as MITI was the brain behind Japan Inc. in the 1960s. . . . 
the Japanese government is now committed to taking the initiative in pro- 
moting greater regional economic co-operation, starting in East and South- 
East Asia. It would do so not on the basis of bilateral relations or even with 
ASEAN as a block, but by regarding Japan, the NICs and the new NICs as 
one economy. .  . . 
Japan’s new hidden agenda is different, because the needs of the country’s 
economy are different. (It is also better concealed.) The New AID Plan com- 
mits government money for the relocation of Japanese industry into lower- 
cost Asian countries as an inducement for private industry to serve whatever 
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Arase (1991, 270-71)  summarizes this plan in  the following way:  “Since 
1987, Japan has been seeking to coordinate ODA, trade and FDI to construct 
a regional economy managed from Tokyo. [It] points to the deliberate con- 
struction of an economic sphere in the Asian-Pacific region. . . .  This is differ- 
ent from the old ODA policy because the new one attempts to structure produc- 
tion  and  trade  within  the  Asian-Pacific  region  according  to  a  grander 
conception of Japan’s regional and global economic role.” 
Katzenstein and Rouse (chap. 6 in this volume) explain that this New Aid 
Plan is supposed to work in four stages: “First, Japanese loans support the 
development of roads, ports, and other infrastructural supports. Second, the 
Japanese government sends technical experts to assist in coordinating indus- 
trial plans for each country. Third, Japanese loans are extended to various in- 
dustries within participating countries. Finally, Japanese bureaucrats and busi- 
nessmen take steps to facilitate access to Japanese markets and to ensure the 
distribution of products imported from offshore factories to Japan. . . .  In short, 
the plan suggests that Japanese business and government elites view ASEAN 
(and the NICs) as one economy, requiring a comprehensive perspective on aid, 
trade, and investment. The provision of  the necessary infrastructure, as one 
part of this plan, will serve the interests of Japanese companies and promote 
economic growth in Asia.” 
A closer look at the available evidence leads to the following conclusion: as 
usual, the Japanese civil servants and the MITI bureaucrats are getting way 
more credit than they deserve for their ability to carry out such a complex, 
comprehensive, and coordinated plan, but to the extent they are succeeding it 
is a good thing for not only Japan but the developing economies of the region 
as well. If the United States had been able to do in the Latin American econo- 
mies with its Alliance for Progress initiative in the 1960s what Japan is alleg- 
edly doing in East Asia in the 1990s, it would have been hailed for promoting 
democracy and development in its poorer neighbors with a second Marshall 
Plan, and not indicted for serving its political and economic int.erests with a 
mercantilist industrial policy program. 
More specifically, four points are worth emphasizing. First, while the New 
Aid Plan reportedly targets “the NICs and the new NICs,” by definition it can- 
not involve the NICs because they receive little or no official aid from Japan. 
Among the ASEANIEs, the plan evidently is not working so well for the Phil- 
ippines, which is getting lots of aid from Japan but not much private money or 
capital. Malaysia can only be a partial participant in the New Aid Plan, where 
Japan is cutting back its official aid while the private trade and investment 
linkages are growing by leaps and bounds. That leaves Indonesia and Thailand. 
If there are only two (or at most three) countries for which the Japanese New 
Aid Plan can possibly be relevant, then one cannot help doubt the validity of 
the proposition that Japan Inc. is creating and managing a greater East Asian 
economy to serve its own economic interests. 
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nesia and Thailand with Japan at the center, it seems worthwhile to examine 
how effectively the New Aid Plan is being implemented in these two countries. 
The first point to note is that the complex cooperation and stage-by-stage coor- 
dination between the Japanese visible hand and the invisible hand is much 
harder to discern than one might expect from the blueprint presented by Arase 
(1991) or  Katzenstein and Rouse (chap. 6 in this volume). To be sure, a lot 
of Japanese aid is going to both countries to build physical infrastructure- 
highways, bridges, railroads, ports, dams, telephone lines, power plants, and 
so on. But Japan has been devoting a large chunk of its foreign aid budget to 
build infrastructure in the recipient countries since long before the advent of 
the New Aid Plan, and it has been doing so from Bangladesh to Burundi. This 
is so because Japan correctly believes that a minimum level of physical infra- 
structure is critical to long-term development of a poor and backward economy. 
The World Bank did the same to put war-devastated Western Europe on a path 
of long-term recovery and growth, and has been building physical infrastruc- 
ture in the member developing countries since the  1950s. It is true that the 
Japanese private sector is heavily investing in both Indonesia and Thailand 
to establish low-cost production bases for exports of manufactures; it is also 
continuing its investment in the oil and energy sector in Indonesia. And finally, 
it does not require sophisticated analysis to  see that new and improved infra- 
structure financed by  Japanese official aid is greatly facilitating the task of 
establishing profitable export bases by the Japanese private companies and en- 
hancing their efficiency and productivity. 
But the argument that Tokyo is using aid money to essentially serve the 
interests of Japanese multinationals is misleading.28  The Japan-financed high- 
ways and telephone networks are essentially public goods: they are not closed 
to the local investors and consumers and non-Japanese foreign companies. Nor 
is it the case that the American companies are paying higher tolls and fees 
for their use of these transport and communication facilities. Indeed, one can 
reasonably argue that American multinationals are getting a free ride on Thai 
highways built with Japanese taxpayers’ money. The central point, however, is 
that what is good for Japanese business in Thailand is on balance also good for 
Thailand’s economic development. 
While Japanese public  aid is benefiting the Japanese private business in 
Thailand and Indonesia, there is little evidence that a regional economy is be- 
ing created and managed by MITI with various Japanese government and pri- 
vate agencies working hand-in-glove with clockwork precision. On the con- 
trary, various features of  the Japanese aid machinery-severe  interministry 
rivalry,  serious  shortage  of  aid  staff,  too  many  agencies  involved  in  the 
decision-making process, too few staff people on the ground, bilateral nature 
28. Katzenstein and Rouse (chap. 6 in this volume) state: “Evidence from Thailand suggests 
that the Japanese have met with some success both in creating the types of infrastructures that will 
benefit Japanese multinationals and their partners, and in obtaining large contracts for Japanese 
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of the aid request and delivery process, and so on-make  it virtually impos- 
sible to implement a plan for the region with any sort of consistency and preci- 
sion. Interviews with the recipient aid authorities and experts also do not seem 
to indicate that decisions are being made under the directives and guidelines 
of a single and well-coordinated Japanese plan. 
This conclusion  is shared by  two veteran  observers of Japanese  aid. Orr 
(199  1,38) refers to MITI’s New Aid Plan as an example of “how Japanese aid 
policy  is hampered  by  its  turf-conscious  aid decision  making  system”  and 
points  out that  “the Foreign Ministry,  which  usually  makes  aid-related  an- 
nouncements, had no perceivable involvement in the policy nor was there much 
support within MOFA for this undertaking.” Rix (1992) argues that “the aid 
implementation mechanisms for individual projects remain unchanged and in 
this sense, MITI is unable to exert control over the ASEAN aid process.” 
Third, to the extent the MITI bureaucrats are able to implement the New 
Aid Plan, it is a good thing not only for Japan but also for the recipient coun- 
tries. ODA that encourages flows of foreign private capital and technology to 
take advantage of regional division of labor and creates an infrastructural and 
policy  environment  conducive  to  their  effective  operation  has  the  greatest 
chance of  succeeding in helping the recipient country get on a path of  self- 
sustaining development. Such aid strategy is much more likely to promote eco- 
nomic development than the current American strategy of assisting countries 
where the United States has political, security, and military interests, and using 
the money to meet multiple-and  often contradictory-domestic  and foreign 
objectives ranging from helping U.S. farmers, to keeping  the pro-American 
antidevelopment governments in power, to burning coca crops in Bolivia in its 
fight against the drug problem in the Bronx, to funding various  and sundry 
development  projects on an ad hoc basis.  So the Japanese plan for regional 
development should not be greeted with anxiety and alarm; it should perhaps 
be welcomed as a model for development assistance with valuable lessons for 
the veteran donors. 
Finally, the idea that Japan is pursuing a “regional industrial policy” in East 
Asia may be seen as yet another Japanese attempt to threaten “the liberal world 
economic order.” But this is an emotional response to what is more a matter of 
semantics than of substance. Many economists and some political free market 
idealogues respond to the phrase “industrial policy” with allergic reaction, In- 
dustrial policy  is considered  a Japanese  and Asian  phenomenon,  reflecting 
anti-Western  values-in  short, a bad thing to be avoided and resisted at all 
costs. The reality is that not a single major industrial nation of today developed 
without an industrial policy (see Hobsbawm 1969, 225-48;  Mukherjee  1974, 
397-406),  and even today each one of them, including the United States, has a 
de facto industrial policy. The only issue worth debating is to what extent each 
of them pursues industrial policy, and to what extent the policy is helping or 
hurting  the industrial restructuring  and international  competitiveness of the 
economy in question. This is not the place to debate this issue. Instead, the 
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marily being driven by market forces, with the Japanese private sector playing 
a significant role within that context; the extent to which the Japanese govern- 
ment is aiding this process is, if unique, not undesirable. 
Now we turn to the other version of the coprosperity sphere thesis that pro- 
pounds Japan’s alleged neocolonial economic relationship with its Southeast 
Asian neighbors. One can identify three major elements that underpin this 
view. 
First, there is concern that Japan has captured too high a market share of 
imports of its poorer neighbors. We  can see from table 8.12 that Japan’s share 
in imports of  the four ASEAN economies has ranged from about  15 to 30 
percent: in 1990, Japan’s market share was the highest in Thailand (about 30 
percent), and lowest in the Philippines (about 20 percent). Also, as noted ear- 
lier, these shares have not grown relative to the levels prevailing in 1975. They 
are, of course, quite sizeable, but that is what one would expect, given Japan’s 
relative economic size, its relative geographical proximity to these countries, 
and the long history of their economic interactions. The United States supplied 
over 60 percent of Canada’s imports in 1990. Economic nationalists may not 
like this degree of  “economic dominance” in their country by  an  economic 
superpower, but that is exactly what results from growing regional and global 
economic integration. 
Second, another often-heard complaint is that as elsewhere Japan pushes its 
exports to its Third World neighbors while keeping its doors closed to imports 
from them and building up huge trade surpluses. By contrast, the United States 
is viewed as the importer of least resistance, absorbing massive and growing 
volumes of goods from these trade partners of Japan. 
There are at least two problems with this view. (1) Japan is a major importer 
of  ASEAN goods. Japan’s persistent surpluses with these economies are no 
evidence of  closed markets: it makes sense for the fast-growing developing 
economies to run deficits with savings-rich advanced countries; indeed, that is 
the only  way  they  can import much-needed foreign capital vital for their 
growth and development. (2) With openness properly defined, it does not ap- 
pear that the United States is more open to imports from the ASEAN countries 
than Japan is. A larger economy is likely to import more from its trading part- 
ners in absolute volume than a smaller economy. To adjust for the difference 
in size of the importing economy, it is necessary to see how U.S. imports rela- 
tive to its GDP compares with Japanese imports relative to its GDP. On this 
measure, Japan is more open to the countries in question than the United States 
is (table 8.13). For example, while U.S. imports from the ASEAN countries in 
1989-90 were 0.3 percent of its GDP, the comparable ratio for Japan was about 
0.8 percent. Looked at from this perspective, the real difference between Japan 
and the United States is not that Japan imports too little from the ASEANIEs 
but that the United States exports too little.29 
Finally, we turn to the aspect of  Japan’s rising economic presence in Asia 
29. A more satisfactory way to look at this issue would be to make use of a gravity model. 358  Shafiqul Islam 
Table 8.13  Merchandise Imports from Asian Recepients, Japan and the United States 
(percentage of importing country GDP) 
1975  I980  1985  1989  1990 
United  United  United  United  United 
Japan  States  Japan  States  Japan  States  Japan  States  Japan  States 
ASEAN-Four  1.2  0.3  1.7  0.4  1.2  0.3  0.8  0.3  0.8  0.3 
Indonesia  0.7  0.2  1.1  0.2  0.8  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.1 
Malaysia  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Philippines  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Thailand  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
SouthAsia  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
China  0.3  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.3 
Sources: OECD (1991b, 1988, 1982); IMF (1991, 1984, 1980); International Financial Starisrics, vari- 
ous issues. 
that seems to create the most anxiety-Japanese  direct investment. As noted 
earlier, the rapid rise in Japanese labor cost since the 1985-87 yen appreciation 
and increasing labor shortage have induced many Japanese companies to shift 
their production base to the low-labor-cost ASEAN countries. Japanese direct 
investment has indeed surged in these economies, and Japan appears to have 
already become the dominant direct investor in the region.30 
Is Japanese direct investment in the ASEANIEs primarily benefiting Japan 
at the expense of the host countries? The answer is no. The ASEAN govern- 
ments are welcoming these investments with open doors because Japanese cap- 
ital and technology are contributing significantly to their growth and develop- 
ment. To  be sure, profit-seeking private business, unrestrained by government 
regulation, often causes various negative externalities, such as environmental 
damage, health and safety problems for workers, sector-specific or economy- 
wide booms and busts, and so on. In  a situation where the host country is 
economically and politically much weaker than the home country and thus has 
less leverage and an inferior bargaining position, the foreign investors will have 
a greater capacity to cause these negative externalities. If  the history of U.S. 
direct investment in Asia and Latin America is any guide, it would be naive to 
believe that there are no negative consequences of  Japanese investment in 
ASEAN economies. Also, the complaints that Japanese companies are reluc- 
tant to transfer advanced technologies to the host nations and that they rarely 
promote local employees to top management positions are largely valid. This 
is exactly what the American and European multinationals did in the past and 
still do today. Japan is hardly different in this regard. It is also true that, with 
growing economic presence, Japan will wield greater political power in the 
region. All of this, however, does not negate the central point: Japanese direct 
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investment in the ASEAN economies is not a neocolonial phenomenon bene- 
fiting mostly the foreign invaders-it  is an economic relationship voluntarily 
entered into and beneficial to both parties. 
The alarm over surging Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in  the 
ASEANIEs appears to be much stronger in the United States than in the host 
countries themselves. This American anxiety seems to reflect a concern, not 
about the economic welfare or political sovereignty of the ASEAN countries, 
but over the loss of this country’s long-held status as the dominant direct inves- 
tor in  the region. This is yet  one more element of  the overall reaction of 
America-long  used to being the number-one economic power with world- 
wide dominance and influence-to  its economic hegemony challenged by an 
economically ascending Japan. Clearly the shifts in relative economic domi- 
nance will have major political and security implications for the region. And it 
is a subject worth analyzing. But the point here is there is little evidence that 
Japanese FDI is more neocolonial in nature than American FDI. 
I would like to conclude this section with two broad observations. First, on 
the issue of an Asian coprosperity sphere, it is instructive to note that the Japa- 
nese New Aid Plan is not too dissimilar from the 1961 United States-initiated 
Alliance for Progress to utilize $10 billion of official funds and $10 billion of 
American private capital over a ten-year period to develop a regional Latin 
American economy. This plan was and is interpreted as an act of  American 
benevolence to help its southern neighbors. Infrastructure financed by Japanese 
aid in Indonesia and Thailand is seen as a part of an official plan to benefit the 
Japanese investors, yet this was precisely a major goal of the Alliance for Prog- 
ress. In emphasizing this objective of the alliance, its U.S. coordinator, Teo- 
doro Moscoso, in a 1963 speech criticized the view that “all that Latin America 
needs is a friendly climate for private enterprise” and pointed out that “this 
view disregards the need for building roads, ports, power plants, and communi- 
cations systems which must be built at least in great part with public funds and 
which in many areas are a prerequisite for the effective and profitable invest- 
ment of private capital” (Horowitz 1970,57). One key difference between the 
Japanese New Aid Plan and the American Alliance for Progress is, of course, 
that the ASEAN economies are growing rapidly with little direct implementa- 
tion of the Japanese plan, whereas most of Latin America remained trapped in 
underdevelopment despite the launching and implementation of  the alliance 
with much fanfare. 
The Enterprise of  the Americas Initiative (EAI) announced by  President 
Bush in June 1990 appears to be a reincarnation of the Alliance of  Progress 
three decades later. According to the U.S. undersecretary for international af- 
fairs, David Mulford (1991), the initiative “is designed to deepen and expand 
for our mutual benefit the wider array of trade and investment ties which link 
the United States with its neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean. . . . 
our long term goal is to establish a hemispheric free trade area. . . .  By itself, 
a free trade agreement would not necessarily succeed in bringing substantial 360  Shafiqul Islam 
economic benefits. But free trade is a cornerstone of a broader economic sys- 
tem based on market principles. It is that broader system that the Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative seeks to foster jointly through its trade, investment 
and debt pillars.” No one is calling this a U.S. plan for a Greater American 
Co-prosperity Sphere; the only complaint is that the United States is mostly 
talking and not doing enough. But one can imagine the Western reaction  if 
tomorrow Prime Minister Miyazawa announced an Enterprise for Greater East 
Asia  Initiative  with  a long-term  objective of  creating a regional free trade 
area.31 
The final broad observation is that Japan’s ODA policy is not based on one- 
dimensional commercialism: it has numerous economic, political, security, and 
moral objectives, and it is becoming increasingly multidimensional and com- 
plex over time. In that sense, Japan’s ODA policy is becoming more like that 
of the other major donors, including the United States. In the area of human 
rights and production of armaments, Japan, at least in principle, has now gone 
beyond the United States: on April 12, 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu announced 
that, in giving aid, Japan would take into account the recipient nation’s human 
rights record, its promotion of democracy, and whether it is developing  and 
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. To 
be sure, Japan will not be able to stick to these guidelines with any semblance 
of consistency; China alone will make a mockery of this. But this announce- 
ment should still be considered a great leap forward. 
The diversity and the nonuniqueness of Japanese aid policy is summed up 
well by Koppel and Orr (1992): 
ODA is a post World War I1 invention. It was born from a marriage of anti- 
communism with needs for supporting economic reconstruction. . . . Japan’s 
ODA was born from the same impulses as American and European aid, but 
unlike any other donor, its ODA was not born from a desire, however tacit, 
to maintain colonial links (as was the case e.g. with French aid), not to build, 
in effect, neo-colonial networks, but rather from a recognition that her own 
development depended on peaceful international economic relations, espe- 
cially in Asia and an acknowledgement that damages she had caused during 
the war required reparation. 
8.5  The Politics of Japanese Money and American Power: The 
Philippines and the Asian Development Bank 
The thesis that Japan shirks global responsibility but is using aid money to 
achieve regional economic hegemony  can be further assessed with a deeper 
probe into two Asian entities. One is a country, the Philippines, and the other 
3  1. Academics and experts must face squarely this issue of double standard and asymmetric 
interpretation of facts; if they fail to do so, they will only supply emotional views under the guise 
of objective analysis, and thereby contribute significantly to the confusion and conflict that con- 
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is a multilateral regional organization, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Both have something in common-special  and close involvement with Japan 
as well as the United States. No other country or institution appears to offer a 
more suitable real-life laboratory for examining the dynamics of cooperation 
and conflict between Japan and the United States than the Philippines and the 
ADB . 
I take up the Philippines first. The evidence does not fit the image of a free- 
riding Japan gaining economic domination with aid money. On the contrary, 
facts seem to paint a picture of a cooperative Japan extending a generous help- 
ing hand to the United States: Japanese development aid to the Philippines has 
increasingly compensated for what the Filipinos see as an inadequate Ameri- 
can aid package to pay for “rents” of the U.S. military bases. 
I have already argued that the linkage between the visible hand of Japanese 
official aid and the invisible hand of  Japanese trade and investment appears 
very tenuous in the Philippines. The Japanese government has been pouring 
massive amounts of  development aid into the Philippine economy, but Japa- 
nese business is not exactly rushing in with their goods, capital, and technol- 
ogy. Indeed, American aid seems to be twice as effective in commercial and 
economic terms as the Japanese aid: the United States provides less than half 
of what Japan gives, yet the American economic presence in the Philippines in 
terms of  exports and direct investment flows is comparable to that of Japan. 
These facts suggest that Tokyo’s aid is not playing a very active role in helping 
expand Japanese economic presence in the Philippine economy or in shaping 
it to fit into a regional economy serving Japan’s economic and commercial in- 
terests. 
Three additional observations are worth emphasizing. First, an  “aid plan” 
for the Philippines was drawn up in July 1989; it was initially proposed not by 
the MITI bureaucrats in Tokyo, but by  members of  Congress in Washington. 
With the prospect for economic crisis and communist insurgency growing as 
People Power overthrew former U.S.  ally President Ferdinand Marcos, and 
with negotiations for the renewal of the 1947 military bases agreement under 
way,  some concerned American politicians argued that only a mini-Marshall 
Plan could save democracy and foster development in the debt-ridden economy 
of  the Philippines (Japan Economic Institute 1988). The only twist was that 
this mini-Marshall  Plan, unlike the original, was to be financed multilaterally 
and the lion’s share was to come, not from the United States, but from Japan. 
In July 1989, nineteen countries and seven international organizations met 
in Tokyo and pledged a total of  $3.5 billion ($2.8 billion, according to the 
Philippines authorities) for the 1989-90 period as the first installment of a $10 
billion package to be disbursed over five years. With the World Bank acting as 
the coordinator of  what became known as Multilateral Assistance Initiative 
(MAI) or the Philippine Assistance Program (PAP), Japan pledged the largest 
amount, $1.6 billion. By contrast, the United States promised $200 million, 
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met again in February 25-26,  1992, in Hong  Kong and pledged  a total of 
$3.3 billion. Japan again topped the list with  $1.57 billion, with the United 
States promising $160 million. These facts do not exactly paint a picture of a 
free-riding Japan. What they say about the United States is, however, less clear: 
one  interpretation  could  be  that  America  is  turning  into  a  Japanese  aid- 
dependent military superpower. 
Second, while Japan is likely to continue its massive development assistance 
program for the Philippines, the United States will sharply cut back its aid as 
it withdraws its military bases.  The United States may  appropriate less than 
$100 million for MA1 funds, and there is pressure to cut base-related aid from 
$363 million in FY 1992 to zero (Awanohara  1992). These facts add up to 
a simple conclusion:  until recently, both  Japanese and American aid to the 
Philippines had at least one common strategic purpose-to  pay for America’s 
military bases. With the military bases gone, America seems poised to simply 
disengage financially from the Philippines, which is increasingly viewed as a 
former colony with little strategic importance, while Japan would likely con- 
tinue to provide assistance to promote regional peace and stability as well as 
regional economic development. Paradoxically,  the only argument that may 
persuade the United States to provide aid to the Philippines is precisely the 
neocolonial and mercantile one that Japan is routinely accused of aid would 
promote  America’s  economic  and  commercial  interests;  a  complete  disen- 
gagement will only create an economic vacuum that Japan will surely fill. 
Finally, the Japanese private  sector is already stepping in to fill the vac- 
uum-one  not created by U.S. cut-off of aid, but by the scheduled withdrawal 
of the U.S. military from Subic Bay Naval Base in late 1992.32  The Philippine 
authorities have already approved  a three-stage plan to transform the naval- 
base complex into an industrial zone with a Hong Kong-style  free port. At the 
time of this writing,  at least seventeen major Japanese private enterprises- 
trading companies, banks, and construction companies-have  lined up to cap- 
ture a part of what appears to be potentially a rich and growing pie. While the 
Japanese companies seem to be ahead of the line, others are not far behind. 
Philippine, other Asian, and American businesses have joined the competition. 
Some twenty-eight  Philippine  companies,  businesses  from  Singapore  and 
Hong Kong, and twenty-one U.S. firms have already showed interest. Even H. 
Ross Perot, the third candidate  in the  1992 US.  presidential race, plans to 
operate Subic Bay airfield as a regional air traffic hub and to participate in the 
construction of a coastal road linking Subic Bay to Manila. So far, none of this 
is being funded by Japanese official aid. Only the World Bank and the ADB are 
32. There is much less interest in nearby Clark Air Base, which the United States abandoned in 
June 1991 in the wake of  severe damage from the eruption of  Mount Pinatubo. The conversion 
plan of  this former home of the U.S. Thirteenth Air Force has been hampered by  continued ash 
emissions from the volcano, as well by the loss of air communication due to the damaged runways. 
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considering funding feasibility studies and technical assistance. This example 
seems to indicate that, while security-motivated official development aid to 
the Philippines may decline, private capital-from  Japan and elsewhere-will 
probably more than make up for it, and in all likelihood will generate higher 
growth and development. 
The ADB constitutes an excellent case study for examining the evolution of 
Japan’s assumption of  global (or at least regional) responsibility, the U.S. re- 
sponse to this evolution, and United States-Japan  cooperation and confronta- 
tion on economic policy and political power in Pacific Asia. This case study 
offers yet another illustration of Japan’s shouldering its international responsi- 
bilities; it also rejects the view that Tokyo is using foreign aid and its dominant 
role in the ADB to establish economic hegemony in the region. Instead, the 
ADB experience demonstrates forcefully that, while the U.S. government and 
opinion leaders continue to prod Japan to assume greater global responsibility, 
their attitudes and actions often keep Japan from doing so. 
I would like to substantiate the above conclusion with six specific observa- 
tions. First, the ADB is perhaps the earliest and most significant demonstration 
of Japan’s willingness to assume regional, if  not global, responsibility, Tokyo 
played a leading role in planning, designing, and founding the bank in 1966. 
And it guided and managed the bank actively in its formative years. Japan was 
intimately involved in formulating the legal structure of  the bank and setting 
its agenda. It also took responsibility for dispatching bank presidents and a 
large cohort of professional staff, as well as putting up the necessary amount 
of money (Yasutomo 1983). Japan did not undertake this initiative under U.S. 
pressure or gaiatsu. The United States insisted on equal status in terms of vo- 
ting power, and Japan apparently agreed. 
Second, the criticism that Japan uses the ADB to promote its commercial 
interests while the United States does not, if true earlier, seems no longer valid 
(see Wihtol 1988,43). To begin with, it should be noted that the United States 
has prevented the bank from funding palm oil, sugar, and citrus fruits in re- 
sponse to domestic commercial interests (Yasutomo 1992). There have been 
no such analogous efforts from Tokyo. In the area of  procurement for ADB 
projects, by the end of  1989, Japan won 21 percent of all contracts funded by 
the Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR), 19 percent of  Asian Development 
Fund (ADF) contracts, and 5 percent of  Technical Assistance Special Fund 
(TASF) contracts. It is worth noting here that, by the end of  1988, Japan pro- 
vided almost 40 percent of ADF money and 57 percent of TASF money. The 
procurement share of  Japanese companies has declined in recent years. For 
example, Japanese share of the OCR and ADF contracts in 1988 was only 12 
percent, and it fell to 7 percent in 1989. Similar data for the United States are 
not available, but one piece of information is relevant. These contracts include 
goods, relative services, civil works, and consulting services. The U.S. compa- 
nies have been the leading contractors of goods for some time and have re- 
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1988, the United States contributed 18 percent to the ADF and 2 percent to the 
TASF (Yasutomo 1992, n. 30). 
Third, Japan’s role in the ADB is going through a critical transitional period, 
creating  new  grounds  for conflicts  as well as cooperation  with the  United 
States. While playing a leading role in establishing and organizing the bank 
during its infancy, Tokyo adopted a low-key approach (the so-called SSS ap- 
proach of “silence, smile, and sleep”) when it came to projecting its vision and 
participating in the policy debate. The main focus was to cooperate with the 
United States, adequately fund the bank, ensure its survival and prosperity, and 
maintain its reputation and, with it, that of  Japan. This survival-cum-image- 
oriented vision-shy approach continued through the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
During the second half of the 1980s, however, there was a dramatic change: 
prodded by the international community and especially the United States to 
assume much greater global responsibility as Japan became the world’s largest 
creditor and capital-exporting nation boasting a superstrong yen, it became an 
activist development-aid power with profound implications for its role in all 
multilateral  financial  institutions,  including  the ADB.  It  dispatched  a  new 
breed of  “young Turks” to the ADB, who were more articulate and assertive 
and who were more willing to voice their views in what should be the philoso- 
phy and policy  agenda of the bank. Also, Japan wanted  to end voting-right 
parity with the United States and be the number-one shareholder of the bank. 
This shift toward forward-looking activism has created two types of tensions. 
One is more like a Japanese schizophrenia-the  clash between the traditional 
habits of old SSS and the move toward a new SSS-“speak,  smile, and snap.” 
The other is a U.S.-Japanese bilateral conflict-over  a Japanese desire to be 
the bank’s top shareholder and over the bank’s development philosophy and its 
future dire~tion.’~ 
Fourth, with rising Japanese activism, Japan’s relationship with the United 
States can still be characterized as one of overall cooperation with underlying 
differences and tensions, which occasionally surface as outright conflicts. Ja- 
pan’s  efforts to maximize cooperation  with  the United  States and minimize 
conflicts  within  the  ADB reflect  the  imperatives  of  maintaining  an  overall 
friendly bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as concerns over 
the effectiveness and reputation of  the bank. Japan’s cooperative attitude and 
actions toward  the United  States-however  reluctant  it  may  be  at times- 
shows up in various ways. One recent example is Tokyo’s support for the U.S. 
nominee for ADB vice president in the face of opposition not only from some 
developing member countries (DMCs), but even from European members. An- 
other is Japan’s  support for the U.S. opposition to resumption of  lending to 
China and its conspicuous silence on concessional loans to China and India. 
Yet another example would be Japanese hesitation  in expressing its views on 
the U.S. rejection of a $10 billion infusion of new funds into the ADE 
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Fifth, within the overall cooperative framework, conflicts between Japan and 
the United States have rocked the ADB repeatedly since 1985. These frictions 
have  arisen  from  a  variety  of  sources, ranging  from mundane personality 
clashes among top personnel to lofty disagreements over development philoso- 
phy and lending policy and practices of the bank. And then, of course, there is 
the issue of a persistent  and perhaps increasing money-power gap, with the 
Japanese running a deficit and the Americans a surplus-a  point I elaborate in 
my sixth observation. In the domain of personality clashes, the United States 
and some other members saw Masao Fujioka, appointed president in 1981, as 
a major problem. He was criticized for his policies and management skills, and 
more for his abrasive temperament. He earned the nickname Shogun for his 
assertive, acerbic, and arrogant personality. On the other hand, many saw the 
American executive director Joe Rogers as an inexperienced ideologue with 
little understanding of Asia, trying to use his “textbook knowledge” to help 
develop Asia. 
Japan has tried to mitigate the “Fuji-friction” within the top management by 
selecting in 1989 a low-key, conciliatory, and amiable Ministry of Finance of- 
ficial as flamboyant Fujioka’s successor. The new president, Kimimasa Taru- 
mizu, is noted  for his typical  Japanese  bottom-up  consensual  management 
style and considers himself an honest broker in mediating differences between 
Tokyo and Washington. Japan has, however, balanced Tarumizu‘s kinder and 
gentler approach to management  and decision  making by appointing high- 
posture, assertive, and articulate executive directors. These directors are not 
hesitant to speak their minds at board meetings: they challenge their American 
counterparts on policy issues and express their disagreements even with the 
Japanese president himself. For example, the current executive director, Ken 
Yagi, is young, knowledgeable about bank operations, and not shy about ex- 
pressing his opinions. 
On the policy front, the U.S.-Japanese  differences go deeper and are not 
easily reconcilable. To resolve these differences as well as to review the bank’s 
roles and missions in the 1990s, an independent five-member advisory panel 
led by the Japanese wiseman Saburo Okita produced a report in 1989. Among 
other things, it called for a greater bank role in two areas-poverty  alleviation 
and arresting environmental degradation, including an emphasis on designing 
environment-friendly projects. The report also recommended increased private 
sector lending. While Tokyo and Washington agree on these goals, the diver- 
gence shows up in the means and methods of achieving them. For example, 
Japan (and the DMCs) find the American insistence on strict conditionality for 
policy-based lending contentious and counterproductive. Some Japanese and 
Asian members feel that the United States does not really understand Asia, 
and its inflexible across-the-board ideological approach is inherently incapable 
of  appreciating the diversity of Asia and thus a threat to development. Many 
Asian DMCs enjoying rapid economic growth consider the perceived Ameri- 
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scension in view of the lackluster performance of borrowing members of the 
Inter-American  Development  Bank  (1DB)-a  regional  development  bank 
where the United States plays the dominant role in enforcing policy condition- 
alities. They also find it annoying that the U.S. hand is unduly heavy in impos- 
ing policy conditionality, but when it comes to funding the bank, the same 
hand suddenly turns empty. 
Finally, the fundamental source of conflict is neither personality clash nor 
policy difference, but the politics of power and purse. More specifically, Japan 
wants to expand the capital base and strengthen the financial health of the ADB 
and take a leading role in doing so. But the U.S. insistence on maintaining 
parity in voting rights combined with its unwillingness to put up additional 
money essentially prevents the ADB from playing a greater role and Japan 
from assuming greater responsibility. For example, in 1988, Tokyo wanted to 
achieve the top shareholder position by increasing its share in the bank’s OCR 
through a special capital increase. This was motivated by Japan’s frustration at 
not getting representation commensurate with taxation, and its desire to have 
others  recognize  that  reality.  By  1988,  Japan’s  contributions  accounted 
for nearly 40 percent of the ADF and 57 percent of the TASF. By  contrast, 
the U.S.  share was  18 percent of  the ADF and less than  2 percent of  the 
TASF. Currently, the United States is also running an arrear of $175 million 
in the ADE 
Japan wanted to formalize this “U.S. free ride” by ending the parity in voting 
rights, but Washington insisted on maintaining the traditional parity by match- 
ing the Japanese contributions to the OCR, thus continuing its representation 
with  insufficient  taxation.  U.S.  Treasury  secretary Nicholas  Brady  argued 
(1991,6)  that the voting right parity with Japan “will enable us to maintain our 
influence in the ADB. We will thus avoid ceding a measure of our influence in 
Asia in general, the world’s most rapidly  growing region.” In congressional 
testimony, one Asia watcher put this rationale more forcefully:  “I  think the 
Asian Development Fund offers an effective channel for American support for 
the economic development of both India and China, two giant subcontinental 
political  conglomerates that  cannot be  easily  absorbed  into  the  Japanese- 
centered economic grid now being consolidated in much of the rest of Asia. 
So the main reason I present for the new emphasis that I would like to see on 
the Asia Development Fund is the need for a long-term American effort to 
build countervailing economic power in Asia to offset that of Japan.”34 
Another example of America’s (and some European members’) efforts to 
undermine Tokyo’s leadership at ADB is its vehement opposition to President 
Fujioka’s 1989 proposal to establish a private sector lending affiliate-the 
Asian  Finance and Investment Corporation  (AF1C)-capitalized  jointly  by 
34. See Harrison  (1991, 23-24).  Elsewhere  in  the  same congressional  testimony, Harrison 
claims, “Japan has attempted to make Bank lending policies serve its effort to establish a latter- 
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ADB and private banks and financial institutions. This opposition partly re- 
flected genuine policy differences, but the politics of  economic competition 
perhaps played a more important role: while most Asian DMCs generally sup- 
ported the idea, America and other European competitors of Japan saw it as 
Tokyo’s ploy to give business to the Japanese banks. The proposal was finally 
approved when an agreement was reached to reduce the maximum share of 
Japanese private financial institutions from 40 to 30 percent, and the ADB 
made special efforts to recruit American financial institutions to join AFIC. 
The irony in this AFIC fiasco is that Washington objected vociferously to a 
Japanese proposal that in fact was a response to the U.S. criticism of the ADB 
for its excessive focus on the public sector and to the US.-supported advisory 
panel’s recommendation that the ADB establish a body to grant private sector 
loans. 
The ADB represents a microcosm of the overall United States-Japan  rela- 
tionship, in Pacific Asia and elsewhere. The bilateral money-power imbalance 
seems to drive the dynamics of conflicts in an otherwise cooperative relation- 
ship. The United States wants to preserve the old power structure, but it is 
unable to put up the money to sustain it. That puts Japan in a no-win situation: 
on the one hand, Tokyo is chastised for practicing checkbook diplomacy and 
not exercising global leadership; on the other hand it is blocked from doing so 
by the U.S. refusal to cede its own power and status. 
8.6  Conclusions 
This paper reaches four key conclusions. 
1. There is little analytical foundation for the view that the national defense 
and foreign aid of the United States (and of Japan) within the context of the 
1960 United States-Japan  security treaty can be considered as international 
public goods. The analytical and empirical basis for viewing Japan as a mili- 
tary free rider is also weak. Thus the notion that Japan can compensate for its 
military free ride with a huge expansion of  its foreign aid budget is highly 
questionable. It is, however, perfectly reasonable to argue that as a global eco- 
nomic power Japan has global responsibilities and should play a greater role 
in various nonmilitary areas, including foreign aid and measures for addressing 
environmental and other transnational problems. 
2. There is little evidence that relative to the United States and other donors, 
the quality of Japan’s aid is relatively low. Also, Japan gives less tied aid than 
do other donors to promote exports and gain market shares. The Japanese for- 
eign aid program, in Pacific Asia and elsewhere, seems to be becoming in- 
creasingly multidimensional in nature, embracing economic, political, secu- 
rity, humanitarian, and developmental objectives. 
3. The interpretation of Japan’s growing economic ties with Pacific Asian 
economies as a Japanese plan to create a coprosperity sphere to serve its own 
economic interests is a complete misapplication of a colonial concept of yes- 368  Shafiqul Islam 
terday  to the new  realities of  modern international  economic relations. It is 
also factually incorrect. Japan provides little or no aid to the so-called NIEs. 
Out of the four ASEAN economies, its recent aid allocation to Malaysia has 
been modest, and its trade and investment linkages with the Philippines  are 
quite weak, leaving only Indonesia and Thailand where the coprosperity thesis 
could be potentially valid. Available evidence, however, does not validate the 
thesis that Tokyo is using ODA incentives and instruments to essentially pro- 
mote trade and investment interests of Japan’s private sector in those two coun- 
tries. There is also little evidence that the Japanese bureaucrats are implement- 
ing a foreign aid plan for creating and managing a regional economy to serve 
Japan’s economic interests; market forces are largely responsible for these in- 
creased regional linkages. 
4. A closer examination of  the U.S.-Japanese  interaction in the Philippines 
and in the ADB turns up additional evidence against the view that Japan is a 
free rider or that it is attempting to build a coprosperity sphere in Pacific Asia. 
Instead,  Japan  seems to be  genuinely  cooperating-financially  and politi- 
cally-with  the United States to support  security  interests  of  both  nations. 
Conflicts arise inevitably, especially at the ADB, when Japan attempts to as- 
sume greater responsibility and challenge the U.S. tendency of maintaining a 
“power free ride.” 
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Comment  Stephen D. Krasner 
Shafiqul Islam’s discussion of Japanese official development assistance (ODA) 
takes on virtually every objection that has ever been raised about Japan’s behav- 
ior and concludes that almost all of these criticisms are unwarranted. The issue 
that activates Islam’s paper is whether Japanese ODA is different from that of 
other major donor countries and whether it is worse or better in terms of the 
benefits that it provides to recipients. 
Foreign aid is a new development in the history of the international system. 
Before the Second World War there were no public capital transfers designed 
to promote the general development of poorer countries as opposed to the spe- 
cific economic, political, or security interests of the lending state (Lumsdaine 
1993). Much of  the current transfer of development assistance cannot be ex- 
plained by  the narrow national interests of  the donor countries. This is most 
obvious for small wealthy European countries such as the Netherlands or the 
Nordic countries, which commit relatively large proportions of their GNP to 
ODA yet cannot expect to reap much in the way  of specific security or eco- 
nomic benefits. 
Is Japanese ODA more closely related to identifiable economic interests 
than is the case for other donor countries? This volume is concerned specifi- 
cally with Pacific Asia. In this area, as Islam points out, the ties between Japa- 
nese trade and investment interests and foreign aid may not always be obvious. 
At the global level, however, there is a closer relationship between Japanese 
ODA and Japanese economic interests than is the case for any other major 
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donor country. As table 8.1 points out, in 1989190 69 percent of Japan’s bilat- 
eral disbursements went to Asia, the developing area where Japan has, or might 
expect to have, the most concentrated economic interests. In contrast, about 
half of American assistance goes to the Middle East, specifically to Israel and 
Egypt. This assistance is designed to enhance the military and economic secu- 
rity of  the region, a benefit that accrues to all oil importers, not just to the 
United States. The bilateral assistance of the major European countries is con- 
centrated in Africa, an area of  limited economic consequence. (In 1987 3.2 
percent of Western Europe’s exports went to Africa and 2.8 percent of Western 
Europe’s imports originated in Africa. The Middle East accounted for 3 per- 
cent of North America’s exports and 2 percent of its imports. In contrast, South 
and East Asia accounted for 23 percent of Japan’s exports, and 29 percent of 
its imports [GATT 1988, table AAlO].) 
Correlation coefficients between the level of  trade (exports plus imports) 
and the level of bilateral aid for the ten largest recipients of ODA were .68 for 
Japan, .41 for the United States, -.12  for France, and .54 for Germany-the 
four largest donors.’ 
This is a  simple measure. Trade  is  not  the only  indicator of  economic 
involvement. These figures do suggest, however, that there is a closer relation- 
ship between aid and economic interest for Japan than for any of  the other 
three largest donor countries. 
The fact that Japan’s aid is concentrated in Pacific Asia, the developing area 
where it has the highest level of economic interest, does not imply that this aid 
is in any way economically harmful to the recipients. On the contrary, the more 
favorable the terms of  aid, the greater the likelihood of generating dependent 
relations that would limit the options available to aid recipients. It is the cre- 
ation of asymmetrical opportunity costs of  change that allows one economic 
actor to exercise power over another. Coercive threats can only be credible if 
the implementation of  the threat would be more costly for the target than for 
the threatener; that is, if the donor country can explicitly or implicitly threaten 
to withdraw aid at little cost to itself and the target country would suffer if the 
threat were implemented. This relationship between economic transactions 
and political power was analyzed more than fifty years ago by Albert Hirsch- 
man (1945). Japan’s relations with East Asia in aid, investment, and trade are 
completely consistent with an effort to create a set of economic links that en- 
gender asymmetrical opportunity costs of  change and thereby enhance Japa- 
nese power. 
Such a policy is neither mysterious nor reprehensible. On the contrary, given 
the level of global uncertainty engendered by the end of the Cold War and the 
fear if not the reality of rising regionalism, Japanese efforts to establish a more 
predictable and stable environment in Asia, by  making Asian countries more 
dependent on Japan than Japan is on them, reflects a prudent concern with 
1. Derived from figures in OECD (1990, section E, table 43) and International Monetary Fund 
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Japanese national interests. Such a motivation is, however, different from the 
more diffuse  and  altruistic concerns  that  have motivated  ODA from many 
other countries. 
Islam asserts that “the view that Japan is gradually consolidating its hold on 
its Asian neighbors in the sense that it is increasingly influencing their eco- 
nomic policies and domestic politics is at best an unwarranted  fear, and at 
worst an insult to the people of these sovereign countries. . . . they are some of 
the most dynamic economies of the world with highly proud people and pow- 
erful nationalist governments.” This is a vacuous analytic argument. The extent 
to which one state can exercise influence over another as a result of economic 
transactions is a function of relative opportunity costs of change, not national 
pride. Aid, trade, and investment can all contribute to such asymmetries. So 
long as the United States remains actively engaged in Asia both economically 
and militarily, Japanese leverage will be limited. But if Asian trade and invest- 
ment do become more focused on Japan, such leverage would increase. 
Of the many specific points made in Islam’s paper that bear closer scrutiny, 
the most provocative is his assertion that “Japan is more open to the countries 
in question [the ASEAN-Four] than the United States is.” The data supporting 
this argument are presented in table 8.13. Islam admits that assessing openness 
in terms of the percentage of GNP accounted for by  imports is not the best 
measure. Large countries generally have lower trade ratios; the normal expec- 
tation  would be that the United States would import less from the ASEAN- 
Four than Japan does. 
This point aside, many of the complaints about the closed nature of the Japa- 
nese market have emphasized manufactures rather than general merchandise 
imports. Table 8C.1 shows the percentage of Japanese and American imports 
accounted for by manufactures (SITC numbers 5-8)  from the ASEAN-Four, 
as well as from other major Asian trading countries. 
In every  instance  a substantially  higher proportion  of  American  imports 
from Asian countries is accounted for by  manufactures. Japan is markedly 
more closed to manufacturing imports than the United States is. 
The US.-Japanese relationship is, as Islam points out, troubled in the area 
Table 8C.1  Manufacturing Imports as a Percentage of Total Imports 
United 
States  Japan 
Indonesia  48  15 
Malaysia  86  18 
Thailand  I1  48 
Singapore  96  41 
South Korea  99  80 
Taiwan  98  69 
Philippines  83  33 
Source: Figures in OECD (1992, 3:ll-86,4:11-85). 375  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
of foreign aid and elsewhere. Japan is now the second largest economy in the 
world. Its GNP, which was about 10 percent that of the United States after the 
Second World War,  is now  60 percent. Japan, unlike any of  the European 
states, has continued to grow at a faster rate than the United States. The growth 
of Japan, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, constitutes a major 
change in the international distribution of power. Neither the United States nor 
Japan has yet found an effective way to manage this power transition. 
Islam points out in his discussion of  US.-Japanese  relations in the Asian 
Development Bank that American policymakers have  not been enthusiastic 
about sharing decision making with other states, including Japan. The ADB is 
no exception. At the same time, Japan’s behavior in the area of ODA, as in other 
arenas, has been closely oriented toward specific Japanese interests. Japan has 
not exercised effective leadership in any global issue area. 
The bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan is the most 
important in the world; it is not being handled well by either country at either 
the regional or the global level. Asia is not inherently stable. Without the 
United States, Japan would be threatening to its neighbors but would not be 
strong enough to impose a stable order. Establishing a viable long-term rela- 
tionship between the United States and Japan must involve a recognition by 
the United States that power configurations have changed and that policymak- 
ing must be more bilateral, if not multilateral, in Asia. 
At the same time, Japan must recognize that stability can be maintained only 
if Japan is willing to give other countries a greater stake in the Japanese market. 
Such a stake can be created only if Japan becomes more open to the manufac- 
tured products of  other Asian countries as well as of  the United States and 
Europe. The most effective leadership that could be offered by Japan would be 
to make the Pacific more truly interdependent. Unfortunately, Japan shows 
fewer signs of doing this than American policymakers do of truly sharing deci- 
sion making. For Japan, as opposed to any other advanced industrialized coun- 
try, real leadership means changing internal behavior more than foreign policy. 
Since 1945 Japan has consistently pursued a policy in ODA and elsewhere 
that has been closely related to specific Japanese national interests. The United 
States has been much more oriented toward milieu goals. Japan is now too 
big, and the United States too small, to continue such policies in the future. 
Glorifications of Japanese behavior, such as Islam’s paper, do no more to con- 
tribute to viable long-term US.-Japanese cooperation than do similar celebra- 
tions of America’s faltering leadership. 
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Comment  Robert Dekle 
Some analysts have claimed that Japan after World War I1 has been one of the 
principal beneficiaries of  an international political stability that came mostly 
at the expense of U.S. taxpayers (Prestowitz 1988, 331; Schroeder 1988). This 
potential “free ride” is said to have provided Japan with the resources to grow 
at over 9 percent per year between  1951 and  1971 and at an average annual 
rate of over 4.3 percent thereafter. 
In this comment, I critique the above claim by reviewing recent studies that 
have shown that even a markedly higher level of Japanese defense spending 
would not have significantly lowered Japan’s real economic growth rate, espe- 
cially  until  1970. The literature  suggests that had  Japan raised  its defense 
budget-GNP  level from its customary 1 percent to the U.S. level of approxi- 
mately 6.5 percent, Japan’s annual real output growth rate would have declined 
by an average of only 0.5 percent between 1970 and 1985. During Japan’s rapid 
economic growth period that lasted until 1971, this fall is negligible, although 
a 0.5 percent  annual fall  is more significant during the  subsequent slower 
growth period. However, I argue that,  after  1970, part  of  the potential  fall 
caused by the increased defense spending could have been offset by increased 
technological progress, a possible externality arising from defense. 
This comment has three parts. In part 1, I review Japan’s defense spending 
and provide adjustments to Japan’s defense budget to make it comparable to 
America’s. In part 2, using a result from the theory of public goods, I argue 
that during the Cold War era it was probably not unreasonable for Japan’s allies 
to expect Japan  to contribute between  3.4 and  6.5  percent of  its GNP on 
security-related activities. In part 3, I review two recent studies on the relation- 
ship between defense spending and economic performance in Japan. 
1. Table 8C.2 lists Japanese defense expenditures for 199  1. The American 
and Japanese defense budgets over time are compared in table 8C.3, which 
shows that during the 1980s American defense spending was on average ten 
times higher than that in Japan. American and Japanese defense budgets are 
not directly comparable. The American budget includes spending on regular 
military forces and military pensions. The Japanese defense budget omits mili- 
tary pensions. In addition, the Japanese government’s support for U.S. forces 
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Table 8C.2  Japanese Defense Expenditures, 1991 
Billions of Dollars 
(135 yen = $1)  Billions of Yen 
Salaries, food 
Procurement of equipment 
Research and development 
Maintenance of facilities 
(airports, housing) 
Maintenance of equiment, 
training 





















Source:  Japanese Self-Defense Agency (1 99 1). 
stationed in Japan, listed as $1.2 billion in the 1991 defense budget, is probably 
an underestimate of Japan’s true economic cost. 
Military pensions actually paid by the Japanese government in 1991 totaled 
3 10.1 billion yen or $2.29 billion. In Japan, there are sixteen American bases, 
including eight in Okinawa prefecture. These bases house 50,800 people in the 
American  military.  The  Japanese government is  partially  responsible  for 
the physical maintenance of these bases and for the salaries and benefits of the 
Japanese working there. Surprisingly, the economic opportunity cost of the use 
of Japanese government land is omitted from the Japanese defense budget. For 
the six bases in the greater Tokyo area, the opportunity costs seem very high.‘ 
It is estimated that American bases occupy 20 percent of the total area of Oki- 
nawa island and almost 60 percent of the prefecture’s navigable harbors. The 
U.S. Defense Department’s Allied Contributions to the Common Defense lists 
an estimate of the opportunity cost of the use of Japanese land in 1991 as $0.71 
billion. Assuming that this estimate is based on official land price data, the true 
opportunity cost could be five times as large.2  Accordingly, we multiply $0.71 
by 5 and obtain $3.55 billion. Adding to the 1991 Japanese defense budget the 
$2.29 billion of military pensions and the $3.55 billion of land use opportunity 
costs, we get $38.33 billion, or 1.09 percent of Japan’s 1991 GNP. 
In the spring of  1991, Japan completed its $13 billion payment to the Gulf 
Peace Fund to underwrite the Multinational Force’s war against Iraq. As does 
the United States, Japan omits military aid from its defense budget. U.S. mili- 
1. Yokota, Zama, Atsugi, Yokohama, Kamiseya, Yokosuka. 
2. After the rapid rise in land prices in the late 1980s. the market price of land can be up to five 
times the official price reported by the Japanese government (It0 1992,417). Table 8C.3  Japanese and American Defense Expenditures Compared 
Japanese  United  States 
Defense (billions  Defense (billions  Defense/  Defense (billions 
of  1988 yen)  of  1988 dollars)  Defense/GNP  Government Budget  of  1988 dollars)  Defense/GNP 







































































































Sources: Columns (l), (3), and (4) are from Japanese Self-Defense Agency (1991). The figures are deflated by  the 
deflator for Japanese government expenditures. Columns (2). (5), and (6) are from SIPRI (1991). 379  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
tary aid, called “security assistance,” is in the budget of the State Department, 
and in  1991, it totaled $8.8 billion. When Japan’s $13 billion Gulf payment is 
added to its defense budget, Japan’s defense GNP share rises to 1.47 percent. 
Since the Gulf contribution is unlikely to be repeated, we omit it from Japan’s 
defense budget in the discussion below. 
2.  The 1.09 percent of GNP figure puts Japan’s security contribution below 
those of  Italy (2.7 percent), Canada (2.2 percent), and even the non-NATO 
European nations, Austria (1.3 percent) and Finland (1.4 percent). In Dekle 
(1989), I  argued that  in  the  immediate aftermath of  the  Reagan defense 
buildup, Japan’s benefits from world security were consistent with its spending 
between 3.4 and 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense. The argument rests on a 
well-known principle in public finance: to have an optimal supply of a public 
good, it is sufficient to tax each person an amount equal to his marginal benefit 
from the public good. If the marginal benefit of defense is proportional to GNP, 
then Japan’s defense contribution should be between 3.4 and  6.5 percent of 
GNP, the defense-GNP shares of Germany and the United States, respectively. 
Japan’s GNP is between America’s and Germany’s in size.3 
3.  Changes in a country’s defense spending affect the country’s economic 
performance from both the aggregate demand and supply sides. The demand- 
side effects predominate in the short and medium runs when the economy is 
adjusting to a different full-employment level. Most large-scale econometric 
models emphasize the demand side, and these models usually predict the fol- 
lowing effects when, say, the United States runs a fiscal or defense expansion 
without monetary accommodation.  The dollar, the U.S. real GNP, and the real 
interest rates rise, and the U.S. multilateral current account deteriorates. Im- 
ports increase due to higher GNP and higher prices for domestically produced 
goods. Exports fall because of more expensive exportables. Depending on the 
model, the current account worsens more than the trade balance; the higher 
interest rate on  foreign debt raises interest payments made abroad. For ex- 
ample, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency predicts that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the U.S. government spending-GNP ratio will worsen Ameri- 
ca’s current account-GNP ratio by 0.77 percentage points (Economic Planning 
Agency 1988). 
In the medium to long run, most economists would argue that the supply- 
side effects dominate in the world. Recently Dekle (1989) and Wong (1989) 
have  separately examined the  supply-side effects of  increases  in  defense 
spending, the former for the period between 1961 and 1971, the latter using 
data between 1970 and 1985. 
From the aggregate production function, making some simplifying assump- 
tions, we know that growth in output is equal to 
3. There is no presumption that this allocation is fair. To  make an assessment of fairness, we 
must make an assumption of what distribution of national income among allied nations is desir- 
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+ ResiduaL4  Output  -  Capital * Growth in 
Growth -  share  capital stock + share  labor stock 
Labor * Growth in 
An increase in defense spending will draw capital and labor from productive 
use. The degree to which output is affected depends on the size of the residual, 
which  is  said  to  represent  technical  progress.  The larger  the  residual,  the 
smaller is the effect on output of a change in the factor inputs, assuming that 
technological progress is disembodied from capital. In Japan, the residual is 
large, accounting for over 55 percent of the Japanese economic growth rate, 
which may explain why Japan’s economic growth is lowered by only 0.5 per- 
cent when Japan’s defense spending-GNP ratio is raised from 1 percent to 6.5 
percent (Denison and Chung 1976).5  If technological progress is embodied in 
capital, the results below may  underestimate the negative impact of defense 
spending6 
Dekle (1989) borrows from the growth accounting framework of Denison 
and Chung and shows that, if Japan’s defense-GNP ratio had been approxi- 
mately the U.S.  level of 6.5 percent, Japan’s national income would have grown 
between  1961 and 1971 at 8.76 percent a year, instead of the actual 9.29 per- 
cent, a decline of 0.53 percent. The reason for the relatively small fall is that 
many other factors besides the growth of capital were responsible for the rapid 
growth of  Japanese national  income. Dekle assumes that defense spending 
crowds out investment in nonresidential structures and equipment one for one. 
Unlike Wong (1989), Dekle assumes that investment in different years is un- 
correlated, and declines in the capital stock are not cumulative. 
Wong’s (1989) study takes into account changes in both capital and labor. 
He finds that an increase in defense spending seriously dampens the accumula- 
tion of  the capital stock in the private sector. An increase in the Japanese de- 
fense expenditure-GNP  share to the U.S. share of 6.5 percent lowers the Japa- 
nese capital stock by 37 percent between 1970 and 1985. The reason the capital 
stock falls so much is that, in Wong’s model, investment is a function of GNP. 
A fall in investment this year is said to lower current GNP, which lowers invest- 
ment next year. That is, the damage to the capital stock is cumulative. Private 
sector labor also falls as more people are enlisted in the Japanese armed forces. 
Since labor supply is less plausibly related to GNP, next period’s labor supply 
is unaffected by this period’s labor, so the fall in labor supply is not cumulative 
and is negligible, declining by only 2 percent between  1970 and  1985. The 
4. Note that the equation is not structural; determinants of  the growth in capital and labor are 
not specified. 
5. The growth accounting literature pioneered by  Denison (1967,  1974) has found that, for 
almost every country, output growth cannot be explained by the growth in capital and labor. There 
are often difficulties in accurately measuring the growth in capital and labor, and the size of the 
residual may partly reflect measurement error in addition to technical change. 
6.  The assumption of  technological disembodiment from capital is probably false. It is well 
known that Japanese technological progress has proceeded by the rapid introduction of the latest 
vintage of capital equipment. The Japanese steel industry, for example, became highly efficient by 
incorporating oxygen-processing and large-scale, open-hearth furnaces. 381  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
combined effects of the annual declines in both capital and labor result in Ja- 
pan’s 1985 GNP being lower by about 7 percent than otherwise. The reason for 
the rather small decrease in GNP relative to the large decline in capital is that 
the capital share of output in Japan is only about one-fourth. A cumulative 7 
percent decline occurring over fifteen years (1970-85)  implies a 0.48 percent 
fall in the annual growth rate of output, which is very close to Dekle’s estimate 
above. In contrast, however, to the near double-digit growth in the I960s, Japa- 
nese GNP grew at only an average real rate of  4.38 percent between  1970 
and 1985. 
By assuming disembodied technical progress, both Wong and Dekle have 
ignored the relationship between defense and technical progress. The effect of 
defense spending on technical progress depends on what the spending is used 
for and which component of private investment is on the margin crowded out. 
If  increased defense expenditures results in more military manpower at the 
expense of private R&D, technical progress may be retarded. 
Zvi Griliches (1987) cites econometric results showing the differential im- 
pacts of military and private R&D. He finds that all R&D spending increases 
the annual growth rate of U.S. corporate output by 33 to 62 percent, depending 
on the year. Basic R&D has a premium over general R&D spending by several 
hundred percent. Griliches, however, does show that basic research undertaken 
by the private sector has a higher return than basic research undertaken by the 
government. Defense R&D is often characterized by inefficient featherbedding 
and cost-plus-profit procurement. 
During the  1960s, most of Japan’s technological  progress  was due to its 
catching-up with the best practice in the United States. The marginal value of 
defense R&D during this period was probably very low. In fact, it might have 
been negative if technological progress were embodied in capital; a crowding- 
out of private capital accumulation would have been detrimental to technologi- 
cal progress. Since the mid-l970s, however, Japan has almost caught up with 
the United States technologically. Higher military R&D could have helped Ja- 
pan move up further along the technological frontier. While the U.S. govern- 
ment finances about half  of  the total U.S. R&D expenditures, the Japanese 
government supports only about 20 percent. Japan is not strong in rocketry, 
supercomputing, and computer software. The development of these fields en- 
tails a high degree of problem  solving and unpredictability  and requires an 
ability to integrate complicated systems. With no guarantee of government de- 
mand for new products, Japanese companies have followed a fairly conserva- 
tive approach to R&D, emphasizing projects with a high degree of commercial 
feasibility. The absence of risk taking may have slowed Japanese technological 
development since the early 1970s, especially in frontier areas such as aero- 
space, satellites, and new materials. Increased defense R&D could have also 
improved Japan’s basic research capacity. Relative to its strength in applied 
research, Japan is weak in basic research. A counting of citations in interna- 
tional scientific journals has revealed that Japan is fifth in the world in physics, 
fifth in chemistry, and third in the biological sciences. 382  Shafiqul Islam 
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Comment  Takashi Inoguchi 
It seems that the organizing concept of the conference was regionalism in Pa- 
cific Asia. By  regionalism I mean  possible or actual Pacific Asian regional 
arrangements that might affect positively or negatively what is seen as the 
United States’ stake in  the region. It is a good strategy to organize such a 
conference. In my view, it has been a successful strategy too. Yet it is some- 
what narrow when one looks at the daunting set of issues confronting Pacific 
Asia in the beginning of the post-Cold War era. 
Global Context 
Let me briefly summarize what I see as the essential features of the world 
order after the end of the Cold War in  general and those in Pacific Asia in 
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particular (Inoguchi n.d.):  (1) U.S. military dominance and the increasingly 
shaky foundations to sustain it in the longer term; (2) concurrent movements 
toward globalization and regionalization; and, (3) trends for liberalization and 
democratization and their destabilizing potentials. 
With the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the sole 
military superpower.  Yet its longer-term economic and technological underpin- 
nings are increasingly called into question in the United States. More vigorous 
efforts to counteract such deterioration in its competitive position are wanted. 
Political temptations to go isolationist are on the rise, especially in the year of 
the presidential election. Furthermore, potentials for competition and destabili- 
zation among regional powers abound in the longer term, at least when the 
United States’ steady downsizing of its presence in the region is not yet made 
up for by some imaginative regional arrangements. 
Technological progress has made the globe smaller and global economic 
transactions much easier. At the same time, intermittent structural adjustments 
become more or less unavoidable even to less competitive countries. The result 
is the increasing temptation to protectionism and regionalism of a malign kind. 
Pacific Asia needs global market access because the region as a whole has a 
much smaller market than its actual and potential productive capacity. Hence 
its vigorous movement to globalize its economic activities. Its need for global- 
ization is made imperative, furthermore, first because the other two major re- 
gions of dense economic activities on the globe, Western Europe and North 
America, are manifesting increasing self-closure and second because the mo- 
mentum for successfully concluding the Uruguay Round of GATT seems to be 
waning somewhat. Hence the need for the two concurrent tasks of globalizing 
Pacific Asian economic activities and enhancing intraregional economic trans- 
actions. 
The entire globe has of late been in the process of economic liberalization 
and political democratization. The end of the Cold War has coincided with the 
trend of unraveling excessive economic regulation and control and of loosening 
political tyranny and authoritarianism. If  Francis Fukuyama calls these pro- 
cesses the end of history, one might as well call these processes in Pacific Asia 
the midway of history. Economic liberalization in Pacific Asia has been slower 
than the other regions of dense economic transactions on the globe. Political 
democratization in Pacific Asia has been slower than in many Northern Hemi- 
sphere countries. The fact that Pacific Asia enjoys a high economic growth rate 
means that structural adjustments are both unavoidable and rapid. However, 
structural adjustments, when mishandled, tend to create social strains and po- 
litical instability. Hence the need for the careful management of liberalization 
and democratization in Pacific Asia. 
America’s Anxiety 
In the conference, the first and third sets of issues were not well addressed, 
while the second set of issues such as trade, aid, investment, technology, and 384  Shafiqul Islam 
bloc formation were more closely examined. While these  mainly  economic 
issues were discussed, the occasional surfacing of America’s anxiety points to 
the importance of recognition of at least three themes that were not discussed 
but that underlay the whole discussion: (1) compatibility of Japan with the rest 
of the world (read the United States); (2)  competitiveness of Japan vis-2-vis 
the rest of the world (read the United States); and (3) contributions of Japan to 
the rest of the world (read the United States). 
Compatibility. America’s anxiety is that Japanese may not be compatible with 
Americans; the Japanese look different and we may not be able to go along 
with them; they should be made compatible with us, as in further market open- 
ings; if not, we should close our door to them, whether it is trade, investment, 
or technology. 
Competitiveness. America’s anxiety is that Japan has unfairly acquired its ad- 
vantage over the United States: the Japanese would be well advised to play the 
game on the level playing field. Furthermore, their unfairly acquired competi- 
tiveness  should be reduced by encouraging them to divert their resources to 
two major tasks: more global financial contributions (e.g., the Gulf War) and 
more social infrastructure investment (e.g., the Structural Impediments Initia- 
tive talks). 
Contributions. America’s anxiety  wavers between  two extremes  of  “Japan’s 
contributing too little, too late” and “Japan’s contributing too much, too fast.” 
The former extreme is America’s reaction to Japan’s reactiveness  in the Gulf 
War, while the latter extreme is America’s reaction  to the Seattle-based busi- 
ness firms’ purchase of the Seattle Mariners, in which Nintendo America con- 
tributed most by shouldering 60 percent of the whole cost of the purchase. 
America’s anxiety over Japan’s possible or actual rise to predominance  in 
Pacific Asia has been real. A number of questions come to mind immediately. 
How should the United States counteract Japan’s rise to regional economic he- 
gemony? How should the United States take advantage of its security hegem- 
ony to block Japan’s rise to overall regional hegemony? How should the United 
States draw a strategy to keep Japan’s neighbors closer to the United  States 
than to Japan? These and related questions were raised in the conference, al- 
though they were much more textured and nuanced most of the time. 
Creating Vulnerability through Technology? 
It seems to me that, by allowing oneself to be guided by these questions, 
one is deliberately creating new sources of strain between Japan and the United 
States. For example, the argument advanced by David Friedman and Richard 
Samuels (chap. 7 in this volume), augmented by Peter Katzenstein and Martin 
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know the subject so well. Yet their policy prescription is located in the sense of 
America’s anxiety. They argue that, given Japan’s tenacious way of borrowing, 
developing, and indigenizing technology from abroad without  subsequently 
sharing  much  of  their  technological  improvement  with  others,  the  United 
States should press Japan to open the market of technology so that technology 
learning would become a two-way flow. If this strategy fails-as  their argu- 
ment would go, I suspect-the  United States should legitimately cut off tech- 
nology flows to Japan. Furthermore-as  their argument would go, I suspect- 
the United States should not allow Japan ,to  penetrate the U.S. electronic and 
other markets in order to undermine the technological and manufacturing foun- 
dations of U.S. national security, since Japan’s ingenious strategic use of eco- 
nomic and technological interdependence creates U.S. vulnerability to Japan 
by supplying parts of military weapons. 
Japan’s counterargument would be as follows: Japan is devoid of natural re- 
sources, especially energy and food, and does not enjoy strategic depth in na- 
tional defense. Japan’s many eggs-food,  energy, technology, and security- 
are predominantly and thus dangerously in one basket called the United States. 
In other words, Japan’s vulnerability to the United States is incredibly deep and 
manifold.  Thus it is natural  for Japan to enhance its autonomous ability in 
some of these areas to a certain extent and at the same time to divert some of 
its eggs from the United States to other regions, such as Pacific Asia and West- 
ern Europe, especially when the United States is increasingly critical of Japan. 
Even if Japan is able to create U.S. vulnerability to Japan in a few areas, that 
would be a much lighter kind of vulnerability than Japan’s overall vulnerability 
to the U.S. Recognizing mutual vulnerability is one of the essential points of 
economic interdependence, after all. Even if mutual vulnerability is not sym- 
metrical,  it could lead to a more stable and sustainable friendship when it is 
managed with self-confidence and mutual trust. To resurrect the already stereo- 
typed suspicion of Japan so tenaciously held in the United States, if inadver- 
tently, by  overemphasizing Japan’s technonationalistic policy and its alleged 
negative effect on the United States, could spoil the overall friendship of the 
two countries and undermine the otherwise more productive interdependence 
between them. And the entire globe will suffer from more restricted flows of 
technology, More speculatively, the tendency to rely on patent fees for benefits 
might accelerate U.S. firms’ tendency to make profits out of nonmanufacturing 
and their decline in competitiveness. It would be more productive to develop 
the scheme of sharing the R&D and manufacturing system and to allow a wider 
range of people to enjoy the benefits of technological progress while giving 
due credit to the innovators of science and technology. 
Aid as a Trojan Horse? 
Turning to Japan’s aid, it seems to me that two kinds of perspective mingle 
nonsystematically in the minds of many Americans. One is that of burdenshar- 386  Shafiqul Islam 
ing while the other is that of hegemonic cycle (Islam, chap. 8 of this volume). 
The former perspective says that Japan’s aid is fundamentally commercially 
motivated. Thus Japan is seen as using aid to benefit Japanese business firms 
more than recipients; it is seen as being less interested in grants than loans; it 
is seen as being not so interested in raising,  the income level of ordinary people; 
it is seen as using aid to promote Japan’s exports to recipients. The latter per- 
spective says that Japan’s aid is used to promote the state-designed scheme of 
economic hegemony in Pacific Asia. Thus Japan’s aid is seen as an instrument 
of economic bloc formation; it is seen as an instrument of political-economic 
domination of recipient countries. What is confusing to me is that these two 
perspectives are arbitrarily chosen in order to advance whatever argument one 
wants to make about Japan’s aid. 
In order to make Japanese counterarguments, one needs to say a little about 
how Japan’s foreign aid is conducted. It started as Japan’s war reparations to 
some neighboring countries of Pacific Asia. Japan was obliged to pay  them 
reparations because it inflicted suffering on them during the war, and defeated 
Japan had to pay them before the resumption of diplomatic relationships. Japan 
made the best use of these payments to increase commercial opportunities for 
Japanese business firms and to accelerate its own economic reconstruction. It 
does not seem that at that time there was any conception of war reparations as 
public goods either by Japan or by the United States, let alone any cooperation 
on the allocation of public goods between the two countries. Japan’s official 
development assistance grew  larger,  in  tandem  with  its  steady economic 
growth. Japan’s official development assistance has been based on its philoso- 
phy of thrift and self-help (Oshin, the heroine of a highly popular TV program 
in the early 1980s and the Ministry of Finance are two good exemplars) and 
of “manufacturing matters” (Noboru Makino of the Mitsubishi Research Insti- 
tute and the Ministry of  International Trade and Industry speak for this). Re- 
lated to these is an implicit Japanese developmental model (Inoguchi 1990): 
that developing countries must rely primarily on themselves, that too many 
grants spoil recipients, that recipients must be able to yield more benefits than 
mere interest payments by  their ideas and efforts, that manufacturing is the 
basis of industrialization, that industrial infrastructure must be built ahead of 
almost anything else, and that, in doing all this, market forces take command, 
not politics, in the longer term. These tenets of  the Japanese developmen- 
tal model have surfaced recently in the publication of  a World Bank study 
on industrialization of  India, Indonesia, and South Korea. Masaki Shiratori, 
one of its executive directors, pushed this study against the mainstream view 
of  the World Bank about developmental finance. The study underlined the 
importance of  the government in economic development along with market 
forces. 
Aside from these philosophical tenets, Japan’s developmental assistance as- 
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firms. The Japanese government has been working until recently on the strict 
principle that only upon request from recipients does it consider giving aid 
concretely. Naturally not only recipient governments but also local business 
firms and Japanese business firms cooperate in drawing up requests for aid, as 
many requests are in the areas of manufacturing and industrial infrastructure. 
Here is how market forces are mingled with Japanese aid, perhaps relaying 
Japan-led economic dynamism to recipient economies. Also important in Ja- 
pan’s official development assistance is that a large bulk of it comes from postal 
savings and government pension programs for which the government must be 
ready to make interest and other kinds of  payments. Because of  this heavy 
foundation, the Japanese government can make its aid sustainable for a long 
time, largely independent of economic vicissitudes from which normal tax rev- 
enues tend to suffer. 
Since the basic picture of Japan’s official development assistance should be 
clear by now, I should summarize the thrust of Japanese counterarguments. 
First, as for the criticism of burdensharing, Japan’s counterargument is sim- 
ple and straightforward: one does not need to carry the Cold War ideological 
baggage in order to assess aid practices. Having moved into the post-Cold War 
era, one needs to fathom more carefully the ideas and institutions evolving 
within national borders and to think what kind of cooperation can be done on 
that basis toward the enlargement of  global welfare, or more specifically in 
terms of economic development, technological progress, social equality, and 
political democracy. Here the notion of global contributions may be more help- 
ful in assessing aid practices than burdensharing. According to this view, the 
wide-ranging areas of common policy agendas, like controlling carbon diox- 
ide, arms control, telecommunications networks, codevelopment and comanu- 
facturing of industrial technologies and commodities, and training bureaucrats 
and business managers, are to be taken as global contributions of one sort or 
another, especially when these endeavors are conceived and implemented as 
multilateral action, with Japan embedding itself in international institutions 
(Inoguchi 1992). When the post-Cold  War era witnesses many competing per- 
spectives on how the globe will evolve and how it should be managed, such a 
global-contributions perspective ought to be taken up more widely, even when 
the role of Japan and the United States is the main subject. 
Second, as for the criticism of Japan’s attempting to use aid as a Trojan horse 
for economic bloc formation or political domination, Japan’s counterargument 
is simple and straightforward: one does not need to be awed by  Japan. Japan’s 
power tends to be exaggerated in the United States, if only to mobilize Ameri- 
cans for self-revitalization. Japan would not benefit in the longer term from 
bloc formation. Japan (and Pacific Asia) needs global market access, not ac- 
cess to one bloc. Bloc formation is counterproductive in Pacific Asia. Japan 
would not benefit from political domination, either. If Japan’s official develop- 
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market-conforming aid policy. No less important is the resilience of recipient 
countries, especially in Pacific Asia. Their nationalism is very strong. It is a 
force in Pacific Asia that has never been fully fathomed by  Americans, even 
after the Vietnam War. 
Pride and Prejudice 
In working out the relationship between Japan and the United States in Pa- 
cific Asia, I would like to evoke the themes of Jane Austen’s novel Pride and 
Prejudice. Both Japanese and Americans have pride. The United States has its 
hegemonic pride, while Japan has pride in its manufacturing competitiveness. 
That it has pride is natural and legitimate. We cannot suppress it. We should 
use it for good purposes. Both Japanese and Americans are prejudiced against 
each  other,  sometimes  poisonously,  often  in  racist  terms.  Their  prejudices 
should not be encouraged to grow so far as to reach the level of the  1940s. 
Both Japanese and Americans need to moderate pride and mitigate prejudice 
to work out their relationship. 
More specifically, the two peoples may be encouraged to think about them- 
selves in a new fashion. I believe that Americans should be encouraged to think 
in terms of “America among equals” and that Japanese should be encouraged 
to think in terms of “Japan among responsibles.” America has been the leader 
until  now  and will be for some time to come. Yet  America’s power will be 
found more in its ability to coordinate among equals as primus inter pares. Its 
attempt to hold onto its position of absolute preponderence, for a longer time 
to come than its own power bases suggest, would accelerate its downscaling in 
power and prestige. Its attempt to punish and mold others in its own fashion 
beyond the direction of market forces would be like spitting against Heaven, 
resulting in its own spit falling down back onto its face. Japan has so far been 
a half-hearted supporter of the United States-led  global community. As Hegel 
says, however, Minerva flies out only in the dusk. In other words, only in the 
declining phase of the leadership can its leader theorize its world vision and 
ideology in a clear, consistent fashion. Japan is not the leader; it has been on 
the rise for only the last two decades; its plateau-like stagnation is speculated 
to come around 2010. Therefore it is not difficult to find that Japan’s role in the 
global community has tended to be largely partial, piecemeal, pragmatic, and 
sometimes problematic. Yet Japan’s role should be increasingly a responsible 
supporter. Its attempt to flirt with the notion of an autonomous, independent 
molder of global affairs is bound to be a farce in the era of global interdepen- 
dence. Nor would its attempt to evade the exercise of  coleadership in global 
management promise success. In the final analysis, however, I am of the view 
that both  Japanese  and Americans  can adapt  to  the  new  environment  and 
to their respective new roles, as they  are two of the most dynamic  nations 
on the globe. 389  Foreign Aid and Burdensharing 
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